Novi oblik sujeverja se usadio u ljudske umove: obožavanje države. Ljudi sami traže primenu metoda prinude, pretnji i nasilja. Teško onima koji se ne poklone modernim idolima! Ludvig fon Mizes
Živimo u svetu u kome kad god se nekome nečija politika ne svidi – on tu politiku naziva fašizmom. Kada one koji nisu fašisti nazivamo fašistima, ili kada one koji jesu fašisti ne nazivamo fašistima već nekim drugim imenom – onda mi na taj način relativizujemo pojam fašizma i stvaramo uslove u kojima ljudi, jednostavno, ne znaju šta je fašizam. Ako ne znamo šta je fašizam onda je on za nas nevidljiv i može biti svuda oko nas a da mi toga nismo ni svesni. Mi se onda možemo čak i boriti protiv fašizma a da ne znamo da ta naša borba u stvari nije borba protiv fašizma, već borba za fašizam.
Poreklo fašizma
Poreklo fašizma je poznato, on je nastao u Italiji u godinama nakon Prvog svetskog rata. Benito Musolini postaje premijer Italije i uspostavlja fašizam kao svoju filozofiju, ali je bitno reći da su i Musolini i svi drugi najznačajniji pripadnici fašističkog pokreta došli iz redova Italijanske socijalističke partije.
Musolini je dočekan sa oduševljenjem ne samo u Italiji već i na zapadu. Zapadna štampa, posebno New York Times, je veličala Musolinija i za njega govorila da je on pravi primer lidera koje novo doba planskog upravljanja društvom zahteva.
Početkom četrdesetih godina prošlog veka američki socijalisti su imali sledeći izbor: da li će prigrliti korporativizam i New Deal, ili će zadržati stare principe. Drugim rečima, oni su morali da odluče da li će prihvatiti fašizam kao neku vrstu prelaznog rešenja na putu ka njihovom konačnom cilju – socijalističkoj utopiji. Velika se borba vodila a iz te borbe kao pobednik je izašao fašizam.
Sve to što se tada događalo je ništa drugo do samo ponavljanje onoga što se, jednu deceniju ranije, dogodilo u Italiji kada su italijanski socijalisti shvatili da se njihov antikapitalistički program može najbolje ostvariti u okviru autoritarne države. Džon Majnard Kejnz je tada odigrao ključnu ulogu u pogledu obezbeđivanja pseudonaučnih dokaza1 protiv “relikta prošlosti” slobodne tržišne ekonomije, a sve u korist “ekonomije modernog doba”, tj. centralno-planske ekonomije.
Po Mizesu, fašizam je samo italijanska varijanta socijalizma prilagođenog posebnim uslovima prenaseljene Italije. Niti je fašizam bio proizvod Musolinijevog uma, niti je nestao sa padom Musolinija. Spoljne politike fašista i nacista, još od samog početka, bile su međusobno suprotstavljene. Činjenica da su nacisti i fašisti tesno sarađivali u periodu nakon abisinijskog rata, i bili saveznici u Drugom svetskom ratu, nije uklonila razlike između njihovih suprostavljenih stavova, isto kao što ni savezništvo između Rusije i SAD nije uklonilo razlike između sovjetskog i američkog ekonomskog sistema. I fašizam i nacizam su prihvatili sovjetski princip diktature i nasilja nad disidentima. Svi oni koji smatraju da fašizam i nacizam pripadaju istoj klasi političkih sistema – toj istoj klasi moraju pridodati i sovjetski sistem.
Nemački model socijalizma
Pre više od pola veka, u knjizi o “svemogućoj državi”,2 Mizes primećuje da kada socijalisti kritikuju nacizam onda oni za njega kažu da je on kapitalistički sistem. U vremenu fanatičnog antikapitalizma i bezrezervne podrške socijalizmu ni na jedan drugi način nećete više diskreditovati neku vlast nego kada je nazovete prokapitalističkom.
Međutim, kaže Mizes, ove “optužbe” na račun nacizma potpuno su neutemeljene. Tačno je da je u nacističkoj Nemačkoj postojao profit, tačno je i da su neka preduzeća pravila veći profit nego u godinama pre dolaska nacista, ali je to potpuno beznačajan podatak ako se ne zna kakva je dalja sudbina tih profita bila. Celokupna potrošnja je bila strogo kontrolisana. Nijedan kapitalista ili preduzetnik, niti bilo ko drugi, nije imao slobodu da svoj novac potroši onako kako on to sam želi, već je svako morao trošiti samo u skladu sa svojim statusom ili pozicijom “služenja narodu”. Sav višak (nepotrošeni dohodak) je morao biti deponovan u banku ili investiran u kupovinu državnih obveznica ili akcija nemačkih korporacija, koje su bile pod potpunom kontrolom vlasti. Svaki pokušaj “gomilanja” novca je bio strogo zabranjen, a svi oni koji su kršili tu naredbu tretirani su kao izdajnici. Uvoz luksuznih proizvoda je bio zabranjen. Niko nije mogao kupiti više hrane ili odeće od onoga što mu sleduje. Rente su bile zamrznute. Nameštaj, kao i mnogi drugi proizvodi, bio je nedostupan. Putovanja u inostranstvo su bila dozvoljena samo onima koji su putovali po državnom zadatku, a jedini izuzetak su bila putovanja u Švajcarsku i Italiju, i to iz političkih razloga.
Dakle, ako je lična potrošnja strogo ograničena i kontrolisana od strane vlasti, i ako je celokupan nepotrošeni dohodak, na jedan ili drugi način, morao biti vraćen nazad vlastima, onda je potpuno jasno da su ti “visoki profiti” bili ništa drugo do suptilni metod oporezivanja. Potrošači su bili primorani da kupuju skupe proizvode i samim tim svi biznisi su bili nominalno profitabilni, a što veći profiti – to veći državni fondovi. Sav nepotrošeni novac se vlastima vraćao ili putem poreza ili putem prinudnih pozajmica, ali svi oni koji su se barem malo razumeli u ekonomiju veoma su dobro znali da će sve te pozajmice jednog dana morati biti poništene. Takav ekonomski sistem je ništa drugo do sistem trošenja postojećeg kapitala jer bez štednje i akumulacije kapitala dotrajalu tehnologiju nije moguće zameniti novom tehnologijom.
Marksisti nikada nisu prihvatili činjenicu da su i nacisti ništa drugo do socijalisti. Za marksiste je nacizam “najveće zlo od svih kapitalističkih zala”, a sa druge strane za naciste je ruski sistem bio gori čak i od bilo koje kapitalističke eksploatacije i nazivali ga “jevrejskom đavoljom mahinacijom za dominaciju nad neznabošcima”. Ali, kaže Mizes, moralo bi biti jasno da su oba sistema, i ruski i nemački, sa ekonomske strane posmatrano, bili socijalistički sistemi. U raspravama da li je neka stranka ili neki sistem socijalistički – samo je ekonomsko stanovište ono koje je od suštinske važnosti. Pod socijalizmom se oduvek podrazumevao sistem ekonomske organizacije društva. To je sistem u kome državna vlast ima potpunu kontrolu nad proizvodnjom i distribucijom, a kako je socijalizam mogao postojati samo u okviru neke pojedinačne države – onda sa punim pravom možemo zaključiti da su i Rusi i Nemci bili potpuno u pravu kada su svoje sisteme nazivali socijalističkim.
Boljševici su bili ti koji su napravili presedan. Uspeh Lenjinove klike ohrabrio je Musolinijevu bandu i Hitlerove trupe. I italijanski fašizam i nemački nacizam su usvojili metode sovjetske Rusije. Jedina razlika između nacizma i boljševizma bila je u tome što su nacisti imali veću manjinu na izborima koji su prethodili državnom udaru, nego što su je imali boljševici na ruskim izborima 1917. godine. Nacisti ne samo da su prekopirali boljševičku taktiku u pogledu preuzimanja vlasti, već i mnogo više od toga. Iz Rusije su uvezli: jednopartijski sistem i privilegovani status članova partije u odnosu na ostale građane; vrhovni status tajne policije; organizovanje političkih stranaka u inostranstvu sa ciljem podrivanja tamošnjih vlasti, sabotaže i špijunaže; administrativna hapšenja i egzekucije političkih protivnika; koncentracione logore; kažnjavanja porodica prognanih; metode propagande; način oslovljavanja; korišćenje vojne terminologije u svim sferama društvenog i ekonomskog života itd. Dakle, kaže Mizes, ne postavlja se pitanje da li između ta dva sistema ima sličnosti, već šta je to po čemu se oni razlikuju?
U Manifestu komunističke partije, 1847. godine, Marks je u deset tačaka izložio mere koje se moraju sprovesti što je moguće pre, a kada je 1933. godine nemački predsednik Paul fon Hindenburg imenovao adolfa Hitlera za kancelara Nemačke – nacisti su od tih deset tačaka odmah sproveli osam. Dve preostale tačke (eksproprijacija zemljišta i ukidanje prava na nasledstvo) nisu bile sprovedene u potpunosti ali se i na njima radilo punom parom, samo ne formalno već zaobilaznim putem: poreskim sistemom, planiranjem poljoprivredne proizvodnje i kontrolom cena.
Dakle, važno je shvatiti da su i fašizam i nacizam ništa drugo do socijalističke diktature. Ruski komunisti su fašizam i nacizam žigosali kao “najvišu, poslednju i najizopačeniju fazu kapitalizma”, a to je u potpunom skladu sa njihovom navikom da svaku partiju koja se bezuslovno ne preda diktatu Moskve, čak i Nemačku socijalističko-demokratsku partiju (klasičnu marksističku partiju), proglase kapitalističkim plaćenicima. Međutim, još od veće važnosti bilo je to što su komunisti uspeli da izmene semantičko značenje pojma fašizam.
U to vreme, kao i danas, za komuniste se obično govorilo da su “levica”, a za naciste da su “desnica”, jer su oni, navodno, imali suprotne ideologije. Međutim, lingvističkim trikovima Mizesa nije bilo moguće prevariti jer je veoma dobro znao da je i jednima i drugima zajednička ideologija bila socijalizam. Iako u nacističkoj Nemačkoj nije došlo do formalne nacionalizacije sredstava za proizvodnju, kao što je bio slučaj sa sovjetskom Rusijom, potpuno je jasno da se takva ekonomija nikako nije mogla nazivati kapitalističkom jer je o svemu odlučivala vlast. Kada vam vlast naredi: šta, od koga i po kojim cenama da kupujete, šta da proizvodite, kome i po kojim cenama da prodajete, koliko ćete radnika zaposliti i kolike će njihove plate biti – onda je sasvim jasno da je takva “tržišna razmena” ništa drugo do najobičnija farsa.
Za Mizesa ni sama podela na levicu i desnicu nema nikakvog smisla. Šta je levo a šta desno? Zašto je Staljin levo a njegov prijatelj Hitler desno? Ko je od njih dvojice napredan a ko nazadan? Niti je napredak prema haosu za pohvalu, niti je suprotstavljanje nazadnim politikama za osudu. Ništa ne bi trebalo biti prihvaćeno samo zbog toga što je to nešto novo, radikalno i moderno.
Dakle, važno je znati da naziv nacional socijalizam nije nastao tek tako, slučajno, već se tu zaista radilo o pravom socijalizmu, a za taj model socijalizma Mizes je koristio naziv: nemački model socijalizma.
Ruski i nemački model socijalizma
Sovjetska država nije bila nacionalna država već univerzalna, internacionalna, država koju su samo postojeći uslovi sprečili da svoju vlast proširi na sve države sveta. Zato se ni u imenu SSSR (Savez Sovjetskih Socijalističkih Republika) nije spominjala Rusija. Lenjin je na taj način želeo da stvori nukleus buduće Svetske vlade. Za razliku od boljševika, nacisti svojoj državi nisu menjali ime već su joj samo dodali reč Rajh (carstvo) – Nemački Rajh.
Rusija se nije slučajno opredelila za birokratski oblik socijalizma, isto kao što se ni Nemačka nije slučajno opredelila za tzv. zwangswirtschaft oblik socijalizma. Rusija je najveća država na svetu, najbogatija prirodnim resursima, a uz sve to i retko naseljena. Rusija se bez većih problema mogla odreći spoljne trgovine i opredeliti se za autarkičnu privredu. U državama siromašnim prirodnim resursima socijalizam bi se veoma brzo pretvorio u opšti haos, ali u prebogatoj Rusiji socijalizam nije morao rezultirati haosom, već samo ekstremnim siromaštvom.
Za razliku od Rusije, Nemačka je bila industrijska zemlja i zavisila od uvoza hrane i sirovina. Da bi uvozila – morala je izvoziti, i upravo zbog toga Nemačka nije mogla prekopirati ruski sistem. Da je Nemačka pokušala tako nešto, istog trenutka bi došlo do potpunog sloma spoljne trgovine, istog trenutka bi razorila sve ono što je stvoreno u kapitalizmu a narod gurnula u potpunu mizeriju. Ruski model socijalizma se ne bi mogao takmičiti sa stranom konkurencijom i zato su se nemački socijalisti morali opredeliti za nemački model socijalizma. Bitno je reći da je nemački model socijalizma manje efikasan od kapitalističkog sistema, ali je, a to je potrebno posebno naglasiti, ipak znatno efikasniji od ruskog modela socijalizma. Ili preciznije rečeno: nemački model socijalizma je bio manje neefikasan od ruskog modela socijalizma.
Nemački sistem je imao još jednu veliku prednost u odnosu na sovjetski sistem: formalne nacionalizacije imovine nije bilo. Preduzetnici su znali da fašizam ne može dugo potrajati. Oni su veoma dobro znali da će Hitlerova vladavina, pre ili kasnije, doživeti krah i zato su se trudili da, dok se taj krah ne dogodi, što bolje upravljaju svojim preduzećima kako bi koliko-toliko sačuvali uloženi kapital.
Dakle, razlike između ta dva modela socijalizma nisu nastale kao posledica različitih filozofskih pogleda, već su samo neizbežna posledica različitih ekonomskih uslova u te dve države. Jednostavno, ruski model socijalizma se u Nemačkoj nije mogao primeniti. Ruski model socijalizma je moguće primeniti samo u prirodnim resursima bogatim državama.
Autarkija
Nemački nacionalisti su stalno isticali potencijalnu pretnju od toga da se druge države odluče za protekcionizam jer Nemačka ne bi mogla opstati kao autarkična država. Oni su bili potpuno svesni toga da su mnoge države, pogotovo male države, tu potpuno bespomoćne jer one tu ništa ne mogu promeniti. Ali Nemačka nije mala, već velika država, i zato ona veoma dobro zna šta joj je činiti: da bi se razvijala kao autarkična država potrebno je osvojiti dovoljno veliku i prirodnim resursima bogatu teritoriju.
Dakle, tu na delu imamo jednu naizgled paradoksalnu situaciju: Nemačka nije želela autarkiju jer se spremala za rat, a išla je u rat jer je želela autarkiju.
Uprkos neoborivim liberalnim argumentima koji kažu da je u interesu svake nacije da uspostavi sistem slobodne trgovine, Nemačka je odabrala drugi put – put protekcionizma. Šampion modernog nemačkog protekcionizma je bio adolf Vagner. Suština njegovog učenja je bila sledeća: sve države bogate prirodnim resursima se trude da razviju svoju sopstvenu proizvodnju i da stranim proizvođačima onemoguće pristup svojim prirodnim resursima; sve nacije se kreću putem ekonomske samodovoljnosti. Kakva će biti sudbina onih nacija koje za svoje građane ne mogu obezbediti dovoljno hrane i odeće? One su osuđene na gladovanje. I zato, kao lek protiv sudbine gladovanja, prepisan je lek u obliku rata za osvajanje novih i prirodnim resursima bogatih teritorija. Hitler i Musolini su opravdanje za svoje kolonijalne namere tražili u tome što prirodni resursi nisu pošteno raspoređeni. Sve što su oni želeli je bilo samo to – da za svoje nacije izbore “poštenu” podelu prirodnih resursa i da prirodne resurse oduzmu od onih koji ih imaju više nego što bi trebalo da ih imaju. Zašto bi ih neko nazivao agresorima kada oni za svoje nacije traže samo ono što je, “po svetom i prirodnom pravu”, već njihovo?
Istorijske prekretnice
Kada se govori o nekim veoma važnim istorijskim događajima onda se obično kaže da su ti događaji bili istorijske prekretnice. Međutim, svi oni koji znaju šta je o tome govorio Mizes – veoma dobro znaju da istorijske prekretnice ne postoje:
Istorija ljudskog roda je ništa drugo do istorija ideja. Ideje, teorije i doktrine usmeravaju ljudsko delovanje. One određuju krajnje ljudske ciljeve, kao i izbor sredstava koje će koristiti za ostvarenje tih ciljeva. Neki dramatični događaji koji uzburkaju strasti i privuku pažnju površnih posmatrača – samo su završni čin ideoloških promena. Ne postoji tako nešto kao iznenadna promena društvenih odnosa. Ono što se pogrešno naziva istorijskom prekretnicom je u stvari samo stupanje na scenu snaga koje su već dugo vremena radile iza scene. Nove ideologije, koje su već odavno zamenile stare ideologije, tada sa sebe samo zbace svoj poslednji veo i postanu svima vidljive. Tada samo i one najneinteligentnije osobe postanu svesne nastale promene; promene koja se već dogodila ali je oni do tada nisu primetili.3
Posmatrano na taj način i Lenjinov dolazak na vlast u oktobru 1917. godine je bio “istorijska prekretnica”, ali je, kaže Mizes, značaj tog događaja daleko manji od značaja koji mu pridaju komunisti. Značaj Oktobarske revolucije za evoluciju socijalizma je bio tek neznatan. Prosocijalističke politike industrijskih zemalja centralne i zapadne Evrope su, po tom pitanju, bile od daleko većeg značaja. Bizmarkova socijalna politika je u evoluciji socijalizma imala daleko veći značaj od eksproprijacije imovine ruskih proizvođača. Britanci su, već 1914. godine, prihvatili najvažnije delove nemačkog sistema socijalne zaštite, a i vlade svih drugih industrijskih zemalja su prihvatile politiku intervencionizma, koja neminovno vodi u socijalizam.
Za socijaliste u pretežno industrijskim zapadnim zemljama ruski model ekonomske autarkije nije bio ni od kakve koristi jer su se njihove privrede oslanjale na izvoz. Ruski izvoz nikada nije bio na nivou vrednom pomena a nakon dolaska na vlast sovjeta taj ionako nizak izvoz se dodatno smanjio. Čak ni fanatični socijalisti nisu mogli a da ne priznaju da Zapad od Rusije nije mogao naučiti ništa. Čak i ona tehnološka dostignuća kojima su se socijalisti ponosili – nisu bila ništa drugo do samo nezgrapne imitacije zapadne tehnologije. Jedino što je Lenjinova revolucija stvarno uspela da donese je bilo – neograničeno nasilje.
Ideje liberalizma i vladavine zakona su u devetnaestom veku bile toliko jake da se smatralo ludošću suprotstavljati im se otvoreno. Javno mnjenje je bilo ubeđeno da je sa despotizmom gotovo jednom za sva vremena i da se on više nikada ne može povratiti. I zato, u početku, šampioni totalitarizma svoje diktatorske ideje nisu iznosili javno, već samo u svojim ezoteričnim krugovima. Dakle, socijalisti su primenili sledeći trik: oni su u svojim zatvorenim krugovima nastavili da govore o nastupajućoj diktaturi proleterijata, ali su u javnost išli sa pričom o punoj slobodi i demokratiji. U tom socijalističkom raju, kako su socijalisti tada govorili, neće biti: ni države, ni nasilja, ni sudija, ni policije, ni zatvora, ni vešala.
Značaj boljševika se ogleda samo u tome što su oni bili prvi socijalisti koji su skinuli maske. Oni su bili potpuno uvereni da je dan njihove konačne pobede osvanuo i da za daljim skrivanjem više nema potrebe. Maske su pale, i kako to kaže Mizes: “jevanđelje krvoprolića se moglo otvoreno propovedati”.
Degenerisana inteligencija i salonski intelektualci, koji su godinama unazad trabunjali o delima Sorela i Ničea, sa puno entuzijazma su prihvatili “novu” i “naprednu” ideologiju. Plodovi Izdaje intelektualaca4 su bili potpuno zreli.
Lenjin nije bio ni prvi uzurpator ni prvi tiranin. Mnogo je tiranina bilo i pre njega ali ipak postoji i jedna velika razlika. Svi Lenjinovi predhodnici su bili u stalnom konfliktu sa idejama njihovih najeminentnijih savremenika. Oni su bili u stalnom sukobu sa javnim mnjenjem jer su njihovi principi vladavine bili u suprotnosti sa prihvaćenim principima pravde i vladavine zakona. Dakle, oni su bili prezreni kao uzurpatori ali se na Lenjina nije gledalo na taj način već sasvim drugačije: on nije bio obični tiranin već surovi supermen za kojim su pseudofilozofi toliko žudeli. On je bio lažni mesija koga je istorija izabrala da donese spas kroz krvoproliće. Zar Lenjin, pita Mizes, nije bio najortodoksniji poznavalac Marksovog “naučnog socijalizma”? Zar on nije bio čovek koji je predodređen da ostvari socijalističke planove za čije su sprovođenje državnici u demokratijama u stanju raspadanja bili preslabi?
Mnogi dobronamerni ljudi toga doba su tražili socijalizam; nauka, kroz usta nepogrešivih profesora, je preporučivala socijalizam; crkve su propovedale hrišćanski socijalizam; radnici su čeznuli za ukidanjem postojećeg sistema plata. Bilo je to vreme kada su skoro svi tražili socijalizam, a onda se pojavio on, Lenjin, koji je bio spreman da sve te želje ispuni. Naravno, Lenjin je veoma dobro znao šta to znači i da se bez polupanih jaja kajgana ne može napraviti. Samo pola veka pre toga civilizovani ljudi su cenzurisali Bizmarka kada je izjavio da se veliki istorijski problemi mogu rešiti samo krvlju i mačem. Međutim, ta vremena su prošla a nastupilo je vreme kada se većina kvazi-civilizovanog dela naroda klanjala onome koji je bio spreman da prolije mnogo više krvi nego što je to Bizmark činio.
Dakle, kaže Mizes:
To je pravo značenje Lenjinove revolucije. Sve tradicionalne ideje prava i zakonitosti su srušene. Umesto vladavine zakona usledilo je pravo neograničenog nasilja i uzurpacije tuđe imovine. “Uski vidik buržoaskog legaliteta”, kako ga je Marks nazivao, bio je napušten. Od sada više nema zakona koji bi “izabranima” ograničavao vlast. Od sada oni mogu slobodno ubijati. Demoni su pušteni na slobodu. Novo doba, doba uzurpatora, je osvanulo.
Naravno, nije to bilo ono što je Lenjin stvarno želeo. Lenjin nije želeo da i drugi ljudi imaju pravo ubijanja svojih protivnika, već je smatrao da tu privilegiju treba da ima samo on. Samo je njega istorija izabrala i podarila mu diktatorsku moć. Samo je on legitimni diktator jer mu je unutrašnji glas tako rekao. Lenjin nije bio dovoljno bistar da predvidi da bi i drugi ljudi, prožeti nekim drugim verovanjima, mogli biti dovoljno drski da se pretvaraju da se i njima obratio neki njihov unutrašnji glas. Samo nekoliko godina kasnije desilo se upravo to. Pored spasitelja Lenjina svet je dobio još jednog spasitelja – spasitelja Hitlera:
Proviđenje je odredilo da budem veliki spasitelj čovečanstva. Ja spasavam čoveka od okova razuma koji bi hteo biti njegova svrha. Ja ga spasavam od ponižavajuće utvare koja se zove savest i moral, i od individualne slobode koju malo njih može da podnese.5
Staljin, Hitler i Musolini su stalno izjavljivali da ih je sudbina odabrala da svetu donesu spas i tvrdili da su oni vođe kreativnih mladih koji se bore protiv prestarelih starih. Onisa Istoka donose novu kulturu kojom će zameniti zapadnu civilizaciju koja je na izdisaju. Na njima je da urade pravu stvar i zadaju smrtonosni udarac liberalizmu i kapitalizmu. Njihov je cilj da nemoralni egoizam zamene altruizmom. Njihov je plan da umesto anarhične demokratije uvedu red i organizaciju, da klasno društvo zamene totalnom državom, a tržišnu ekonomiju socijalizmom. Njihov rat nema ništa zajedničko sa ratovima iz prošlosti kada su imperijalističke sile ratovale zarad osvajanja novih teritorija, hegemonije i pljačke. Njihov rat je “sveti rat” zarad stvaranja novog i boljeg sveta. Oni u tom ratu moraju pobediti jer su oni rođeni na talasu budućnosti. Jednostavno, velike istorijske promene se ne mogu ostvariti mirnim putem već je potreban rat. Po njima, bilo bi sitničavo i glupo prevideti sav taj kreativni kvalitet njihovog rada samo zbog nekih “neprijatnosti” koje svetske revolucije sa sobom uvek nose. Točak istorije se ne može zaustaviti niti se vreme može vratiti unazad.6
“Država je bog”
Pokušavajući da na što jednostavniji način objasni suštinu etatizma, Mizes kaže sledeće:
U etatizmu prava i istinska država je ona država u kojoj smo ja i moji prijatelji – tj. svi oni koji govore mojim jezikom i misle kao ja – vrhovna vlast, dok su svi drugi nebitni. Istina, u ovom nesavršenom svetu, i oni postoje, ali su oni neprijatelji moje države, jedine prave i istinske države, iako ta država ne postoji nigde drugo osim u mojim snovima i željama.
Ferdinand Lasal je bio jedan od onih koji su Nemačku upoznali sa idejama etatizma i socijalizma. Lasalove su reči: “Ne treba da napadaš državu, već klasu eksploatatora. Država je tvoj prijatelj; ali, naravno, ne ova država kojom vlada Bizmark, već država kojom ću vladati ja, Lasal.”
Upravo nam ova Lasalova rečenica potvrđuje ono o čemu smo već govorili,7 da je velika zabluda misliti da svi zagovornici socijalizma žele isti socijalizam. Sasvim suprotno, svaki socijalista želi svoj sopstveni socijalizam a sebe vidi ni manje ni više nego na mestu “diktatora nad diktatorima” ili “despota nad despotima”.8
Objašnjavajući ulogu Lasala u procesu nacifikacije Nemačke, Mizes kaže da Lasal nije bio nacista već samo njihova prethodnica i prvi Nemac koji je za sebe tražio ulogu firera. Lasal je takođe poznat po rečima koje na najbolji mogući način objašnjavaju etatizam: “država je bog”.
U kapitalističkom društvu preduzetnik zavisi od tržišta. Preduzetnik mora da služi drugima kako bi drugi služili njemu.9 Svaki preduzetnik i svaki vlasnik sredstava za proizvodnju svakoga dana mora sprovoditi svoju društvenu funkciju tako što će raditi u skladu sa željama kupaca. U socijalističkom društvu nema ni tržišta ni zadovoljenja želja kupaca, a sva sredstva za proizvodnju su u rukama onih koji su na vlasti. Niko ne ispunjava ničije želje i niko ni od koga ne zavisi, već svi zajedno zavise od klike na vlasti. Plate ne zavise od rada već ih određuje klika na vlasti. Nema cena, nema cenovnog sistema, nema profita, nema motivacije, nema ničeg. O svemu odlučuje vlast a svi ostali samo izvršavaju svoje radne zadatke. Dakle, potpuno je jasno šta je Lasal mislio kada je rekao: država je bog.
Ukoliko bi država, kaže Mizes, bila organizovana na pravi način, onda bi ona zaista mogla biti temelj jednog društva na kojem bi se izgradio sistem zaštite ljudi i njihove imovine, tj. sistem koji bi obezbedio uslove za saradnju ljudi. Ali potrebno je znati da je država samo sredstvo za postizanje ciljeva, a ne cilj sam po sebi. Država nije bog, kako to kaže Lasal, već samo sredstvo prisile. Kada neko kaže da “zakon treba da reguliše neku materiju”, onda on tada u stvari kaže da policiji treba dati pravo da putem prisile natera ljude da se ponašaju onako kako to vlast želi, i to bez obzira da li je taj zakon dobar ili ne. Ljudi obično misle da zakoni moraju biti dobri, ali kada se nekome da pravo da po svojoj sopstvenoj želji zakone: donosi, tumači i sprovodi – onda je samo pitanje vremena kada će doći do zloupotrebe tog prava.
Dakle, država nije bog, kaže Mizes, i dodaje:
Država je ljudska institucija, a ne natprirodno biće. Obožavanje države je obožavanje sile. Nema veće pretnje za civilizaciju od vladavine nekompetentnih, korumpiranih ili zlih ljudi. Najveća zla koja su ikada zadesila čovečanstvo – počinjena su od strane loših vlasti.
U Ljudskom delovanju10 Mizes kaže da ne postoji racionalni motiv za obožavanje policijske moći, niti za nju treba vezivati reči kao što su svemoć i sveznanje jer je potpuno jasno da postoji dosta stvari koje ona ne može rešiti. Policija ne može rešiti problem nedostatka činilaca proizvodnje, policija ne može ljude učiniti uspešnijim, niti može povećati produktivnost rada. Sve što policija stvarno može da učini je to da spreči gangstere u njihovoj nameri da osujete napore onih ljudi koji rade na poboljšanju materijalnog položaja ljudi.
Ljudima bi moralo biti jasno da je Marksova ljubav prema demokratskim institucijama bila samo varka i lukavi manevar za prevaru naroda jer u socijalističkom društvenom uređenju nema mesta ni za demokratiju ni za slobodu. Nema slobode izbora posla kojim ćemo se baviti ako je država jedini poslodavac. Nema slobode izbora mesta gde ćemo živeti ako država određuje gde će se i šta proizvoditi. Nema naučnih istraživanja ako država pod svojom kontrolom drži sve biblioteke, arhive, laboratorije i odlučuje ko se može baviti naukom a ko ne. Nema slobode umetničkog izražavanja ako država odlučuje šta je umetnost i ko će biti umetnik. Nema slobode govora ako država ima moć da sankcioniše svaku izgovorenu reč koja nije u skladu sa proklamovanom “konačnom istinom”. I zato, kaže Mizes, u socijalizmu čovek može imati slobode isto koliko i vojnik u vojsci ili siroče u sirotištu.
Pravo značenje etatizma Mizes objašnjava sledećim rečima:
Suština etatizma je u uzimanju od jednih i davanju drugima. Što više država može da uzme, može više da da. Zato je u interesu onih kojima vlast daje da država bude što veća.
Međutim, potpuno je jasno da to povećavanje države ne može ići u nedogled i zato svaki etatizam, bio on intervencionizam ili socijalizam – uvek vodi ka sukobima, ratovima i totalitarnom ugnjetavanju velikog dela naroda. Upravo zbog toga, svima onima koji zaista žele mir – Mizes poručuje:
Svi oni koje žele mir među narodima – moraju se boriti protiv etatizma.
Mit o uspesima Hitlerove ekonomije
Istorijski je mit kada ljudi veruju da je prošlost bila drugačija nego što je ona stvarno bila. Svi mitovi su štetni ali su neki od njih posebno štetni jer u značajnoj meri utiču na ljudsko razumevanje ne samo prošlosti već i sadašnjosti, a sve to stvara uslove za donošenje nekih veoma štetnih i opasnih odluka. Jedan od tih posebno štetnih mitova je i mit o “velikim uspesima Hitlerove ekonomije”. Po tom mitu: tačno je da je Hitler bio veliki zločinac i učinio mnoga zla, ali kada je u pitanju ekonomija – onda nacistima kapa dole. Tu se naročito ističu uspesi u pogledu rešavanja problema nezaposlenosti, javni radovi i sjajna monetarna politika. Naravno, do stvaranja tog mita nikada ne bi ni došlo da nije bilo i nekih vidljivih rezultata, ali čim se krene sa dubljom analizom – onda se istoga trenutka taj mit o uspesima Hitlerove ekonomije rasprši kao mehur od sapunice.
Nemačka je krenula putem masovnog intervencionizma, a ako znamo da svaka državna intervencija stvara probleme, a samim tim i zahteva novu intervenciju, onda je potpuno jasno da će sve privredne aktivnosti, pre ili kasnije, biti pod direktnom državnom kontrolom. Svi oni koji su se protivili novom poretku – bili su potčinjeni putem sile. U nacističkoj Nemačkoj je postojao čak i zakon koji je vlastima dozvoljavao prinudno uspostavljanje kartela, a krajem 1936. godine Gering je dobio punomoćje za donošenje četvorogodišnjeg plana. Od tog momenta Gering preuzima potpunu kontrolu nad nemačkom ekonomijom.
Nemačka je primenila Kejnzovu “novu ekonomiju”, ali je bilo i onih koji su Hitlera stavljali čak i iznad Kejnza i govorili da je “Hitler našao lek za nezaposlenost pre nego što je Kejnz završio sa objašnjavanjem svoje nove ekonomske politike.” O kakvoj se tu ekonomskoj politici radi? Hitler je suspendovao zlatni standard, krenuo sa programima velikih javnih radova i zaštitio industriju od strane konkurencije. Zatim, usledila je velika kreditna ekspanzija, ogroman budžetski deficit, potpuna kontrola novčanih tokova, programi za zapošljavanje, razaranje preduzetništva putem kontrole cena i komandne ekonomije, masovno naoružavanje, kontrola obrazovanja, planiranje porodice, uvođenje državnog zdravstva, državno socijalno osiguranje itd.
Vampirska ekonomija
Sjajan prikaz te “uspešne” Hitlerove ekonomije daje nam Ginter Rajman (Günter Reimann) u knjizi Vampirska ekonomija.11 Rejman objašnjava način na koji je nacistička čudovišna mašinerija, putem strogih propisa i oštre inspekcije, razorila autonomiju privatnog sektora.
U nemačkom modelu socijalizma nema ni direktne eksproprijacije sredstava za proizvodnju, niti je jedan od ciljeva ona fiktivna jednakost. U nemačkom modelu socijalizma kapitalisti nominalno ostaju vlasnici sredstava za proizvodnju, što znači da oni formalno i dalje ostaju vlasnici svoje imovine. Međutim, to njihovo vlasništvo je više fikcija nego stvarnost jer o svemu odlučuje država. Za razliku od sovjetskog modela socijalizma u kojem se socijalisti sa postojećim institucijama obračunavaju tako što ih ukidaju, fašisti se odlučuju za fuziju države i institucija, tj. oni te institucije apsorbuju. Fašistička ekonomska strategija se sastoji u partnerstvu između države i biznisa, pri čemu se do tog “partnerstva” dolazi putem sile. Svi oni koji se “dobrovoljno” ne udruže sa državom – reskiraju da im imovina bude i formalno konfiskovana, a i hapšenje vlasnika imovine je jedna od mogućih opcija. Tehnički aspekt funkcionisanja tog partnerstva Rejman opisuje na sledeći način:
Država se ne bavi proizvodnjom direktno, već samo naređuje vlasnicima kapitala šta da proizvode. Ukoliko se i dogodi da se država neposredno bavi proizvodnjom, to je više izuzetak nego pravilo. Fašistička država se ne bavi samo davanjem dozvola za rad preduzetnicima, a da onda preduzetnici slobodno proizvode za tržište, već preduzetnici moraju proizvoditi samo ono što im država naredi pa makar to i ne donosilo profit. Uprkos tome što biznismen pravi gubitak, a ne profit, on ne sme obustaviti proizvodnju jer je i za obustavu proizvodnje potrebna dozvola vlasti.
Industrijalce su posećivali državni revizori koji su imali striktna uputstva za kontrolu poslovnih knjiga privatnih kompanija. Knjige su kontrolisali detaljno, čak dve ili tri godine unazad, sve dok ne bi pronašli neku grešku. Čak i najmanja formalna greška je bila dovoljan razlog za veliku kaznu koja je mogla iznositi čak i nekoliko miliona maraka. Rejman citira reči jednog biznismena koji kaže:
Ne možete ni zamisliti šta sve država sada kontroliše i koliko su velika njihova ovlašćenja. Najgore u svemu tome je njihova neukost i potpuna nezainteresovanost; osim distribucije bogatstva ništa drugo njih ne interesuje. Da bi shvatili postojeći ekonomski sistem neki biznismeni su čak počeli da izučavaju marksističku teoriju.
Dok su predstavnici države zaokupljeni istragama i mešanjem u rad biznismena, našim komercijalistima su vezane ruke jer ne znaju da li će se prodaja proizvoda po višoj ceni okarakterisati kao profiterstvo ili sabotaža, a oni biti uhapšeni. Ne možete ni zamisliti koliko su se porezi povećali. Nezadovoljstvo je veliko, narod je ogorčen, ali se niko ne usuđuje da o tome javno govori. U sadašnji sistem ne sumnjanju samo oni koji su ili previše mladi, ili previše glupi, ili oni koji su sistemski privilegovani.
U nemačkom modelu socijalizma sloboda i nezavisnost su samo puka dekoracija. Kapitalista nije pravi vlasnik svoga kapitala već on mora postupati po naređenjima predstavnika vlasti. Kapitalista ne sme insistirati na svojim pravima niti se sme ponašati kao da je njegova imovina zaista njegova. Svi oni koji su neoprezno nešto rekli protiv tadašnjeg sistema – imali su posla sa državnom tajnom policijom.
Od svih biznismena najteže je bilo vlasnicima malih radnji jer su oni bili pod stalnom kontrolom. Član partije, od čije dobre volje zavisi vlasnik radnje, ne živi u dalekom Berlinu, već u susednoj kući ili u kući tu odmah iza ugla. Taj “lokalni Hitler” svakoga dana dobija izveštaj šta se događalo i o čemu se govorilo i u pekari gospodina Šulca i u mesari gospodina Šmita. ako bi se desilo da se ta dva gospodina previše bune, preko noći bi mogli biti proglašeni za državne neprijatelje. To bi, u najboljem slučaju, značilo smanjenje kvota za nabavku deficitarnih proizvoda, a moglo bi se desiti i da izgube dozvolu za rad.
Nacistički zakoni
U okviru “ustava” Trećeg Rajha, nikakvo mišljenje nezavisno od volje firera više nije postojalo. Princip podele vlasti je stvar prošlosti. Po rečima finansijskog urednika jednih nemačkih novina:
Ne postoji nijedan zakon koji obavezuje državu. Država može da uradi sve ono što ona sama smatra da je neophodno jer je ona vlast.
Sve što je rađeno u nacističkoj Nemačkoj – rađeno je u ime nacionalnog interesa, ali o tome šta je nacionalni interes – odlučuju partijski lideri i birokratija. Partija je bič kojim partijski lideri kontrolišu kako administraciju tako i ponašanje svakog građanina, bez obzira da li on upravljao industrijom čelika, malom prodavnicom ili bio obični radnik. Partija ima svoj sopstveni sud i sudije jer za članove partije ne važe zvanični zakoni; oni ne samo da imaju pravo, već i obavezu da krše zakone u cilju odbrane partijskog autoriteta.
Kapitalista u fašizmu ne samo da mora poštovati zakone, već se mora pokoriti državnim predstavnicima. On ne sme insistirati na svojim pravima i ne sme se ponašati kao da mu je pravo na ličnu imovinu najvažnije. On mora biti zahvalan fireru što uopšte još ima ličnu imovinu. Naravno, takav sistem razara poslovni moral, samopoštovanje i oslanjanje na svoje snage, tj. razara sve ono što karakteriše preduzetnike u liberalnom kapitalizmu.
Rejman navodi reči jednog svog dobrog prijatelja koji je uveren da će se, nakon eksproprijacije imovine Jevreja, pre ili kasnije, nacisti obrušiti i na imovinu “belih Jevreja”, tj. “obrušiće se i na nas – biznismene arijevce”. Kada će se to tačno dogoditi – to zavisi od borbe unutar same partije. Kao vatreni nemački nacionalista, on je mislio da će ih Hitler spasiti od boljševika i Jevreja. On ni sanjao nije da će novi režim udariti na njegova Bogom dana prava i mešati se u njegove poslove daleko više nego socijal-demokrate koje je toliko mrzeo.
Kada je jedan zemljoposednik shvatio da više nema ni suda, niti bilo koga drugog ko bi ga mogao zaštiti, on se za pomoć obraća svom nekadašnjem prijatelju bankaru:
Želeo bih da svu svoju likvidnu imovinu investiram na, koliko god je to moguće, siguran način, tj. na način da je se ne mogu dokopati ni vlast ni partija. Ranije sam uvek odbijao da se bavim berzanskim spekulacijama ali bih sada i na to pristao. Hteo bih da kupim farmu u Africi. Verovatno će prinosi od žetve podbaciti, ja ću biti okrivljen za sabotažu, a mojim imanjem će tada upravljati neki partijski činovnik. Želeo bih da se spremim za tu situaciju i da sebi obezbedim neko mesto gde mogu otići ako partija odluči da mi oduzme imovinu.
Bankar je primoran da svom prijatelju saopšti neprijatnu činjenicu da je to što on traži nemoguće. Vlast mu neće dozvoliti da napusti Nemačku sa više od deset maraka. Farma u Africi mu više nije opcija; moraće da ostane tu gde jeste.
Korupcija
U fašizmu ni korupcija nije pitanje samo običnog podmićivanja već je čitav proces znatno komplikovaniji. Član partije koji kontroliše distribuciju sirovina, ili se bavi nekim drugim važnim državnim poslom, novac nikada ne uzima direktno. Kada razgovarate sa partijskim liderom vi mu tada ne nudite novac, već ga samo pitate da li bi vam on mogao preporučiti nekog dobrog pravnika koji bi vam mogao pomoći u postupku ubeđivanja vlasti u pogledu hitnosti i opravdanosti vašeg zahteva. Onda vam partijski lider preporuči pravnika koji vam da neophodni “pravni savet” kako biste, eventualno, dobili to što želite. Međutim, cena tog pravnog saveta je izuzetno visoka, znatno viša nego u sistemu direktnog podmićivanja. Ma kako ta cena bila visoka, ona se mora platiti jer je nemoguće voditi biznis bez održavanja tesnih veza sa tim pravnicima. Vi u potpunosti zaviste od njih jer vam oni mogu reći da li uopšte možete ostvariti to što ste naumili. Dobar “pravni savetnik” tačno zna da li se, i u kojoj meri, neki zakon može zaobići.
Dakle, jasno je da reč korupcija ovde ima potpuno drugačije značenje u odnosu na ono što se pod njom podrazumeva u pravnim državama. Za razliku od kapitalizma u kome je novac taj koji korumpira, u fašističkom sistemu izvor korupcije je sama država. Naravno, i fašistički sistem se takođe oslanja na novčanu ekonomiju, ali za razliku od kapitalizma u kome je novac potrebno zaraditi – fašisti do novca dolaze tako što ga oduzmu od onih koji ga imaju.
U fašizmu imamo dve vrste moći: prva je indirektna moć – moć novca, a druga je direktna moć – moć partijskih lidera. Kada neki kapitalista, zarad sticanja neke privilegije, podmiti nekog partijskog lidera, onda se tu radi o indirektnoj moći. Međutim, kada neki partijski predstavnik od kapitaliste iznudi novac, a bez ikakve garancije za neku kasniju protivuslugu – onda se tu radi o direktnoj moći.
Osoba za kontakte
Službe koje su nekada u kompanijama imale izuzetno važnu ulogu, u fašizmu su postale beznačajne. Sa druge strane, neke druge službe, službe kojih pre nije ni bilo, u fašizmu postaju najznačajnije službe. Umesto onih koji su radili na najodgovornijim mestima nabavke i prodaje, u fašizmu najvažniji čovek u kompaniji postaje “čovek za kontakte”. Njegov je posao da održava što je moguće bolje odnose sa predstavnicima vlasti u tzv. “ministarstvu ekonomije”. On je tamo skoro svakoga dana, on detaljno izučava sve zakone i uredbe, on tačno zna kako da svu tu novu regulativu tumači na pravi način i ima sposobnost pogađanja šta bi moglo biti dozvoljeno, a šta je stvarno zabranjeno. Drugim rečima rečeno, njegov je posao da tačno zna koliko daleko neko može ići a da ne bude uhvaćen.
Osoba za kontakte mora razvijati jedno posebno znanje koje će mu omogućiti kamufliranje ličnih interesa, tj. omogućiti da lične interese predstavi kao “opštedruštvene ili državne interese”. U zavisnosti od toga kom se sekretarijatu obraća, on mora odabrati odgovarajući način obraćanja, retoriku, argumente koje će iznositi i sve ostalo. Zato se nimalo nije čuditi tome što su u novinama nacističke Nemačke najviše prostora zauzimali oglasi u kojima su se posebno naglašavale “posebne sposobnosti”, “veštine” i “iskustvo” u pregovorima sa vlastima. Primera radi, u skoro svakom izdanju Frankfurter Zeitung-a se moglo pročitati:
Korporativni pravnik, dr. pol. ekon., 35 godina, član partije, trenutno angažovan na raznovrsnim poslovima u više banaka i udruženja, želi da preuzme dodatnu odgovornost u trgovinskim udruženjima ili industriji…”, ili “Kao ekonomski savetnik, radio na veoma odgovornim poslovima pregovaranja sa predstavnicima vlasti u Berlinu…”, ili “Tehničar i biznismen, član partije, bivši oficir vojne avijacije, dobre veze sa vlastima, traži zaposlenje, ili ako je moguće partnerstvo u nekom preduzeću….”
Dakle, onaj kome je bio potreban čovek za kontakte, ako je bio spreman da plati odgovarajuću cenu, mogao je bez većih poteškoća takvog čoveka naći. Svi oni koji nisu imali čoveka za kontakte, makar bili i “čistokrvni arijevci”, ostajali su bez biznisa. Jednostavno, u fašističkoj Nemačkoj se bez odgovarajuće potvrde, dozvole ili kvote nije moglo raditi.
Sirovine
Nemački preduzetnik je najmanje pola svog radnog vremena trošio baveći se problemom obezbeđivanja sirovina. Obično je svakom proizvođaču potrebno barem desetak sirovina, a nijednu od njih nije bilo moguće kupiti bez potvrde nekog nadzornog odbora. Za svaku sirovinu je postojao posebni nadzorni odbor sa posebnom procedurom koju je trebalo ispoštovati. Milioni upitnika su bili poslati da bi se stekla prava slika u pogledu potreba i raspoloživosti sirovina, ali je rezultat izostao jer sirovina nije bilo dovoljno za sve, već samo za ono što je bio prioritet. Problem je u tome što birokratija nikako nije mogla doneti odluku čije su potrebe zaista bile hitne i prioritetne, a čije ne. Sirovine su dobijali samo oni koji su imali “potvrde o hitnosti”, ali se veoma brzo pokazalo da je čak i tih potvrda izdato znatno više nego što ima raspoloživog materijala. Tada dolazi do prave lavine žalbi svih onih koji su teškom mukom došli do potvrde o hitnosti, da bi tek onda saznali da obezbeđivanje same potvrde ne znači i automatsko obezbeđivanje materijala. Situacija je bila sve gora jer je sa sve većom nestašicom sirovina sve više proizvođača za sebe tražio povlašćen tretman.
Kontrola cena
Pripadnik “stare garde”, Jozef Vagner, bio je postavljen za komesara za cene. Komesarijat je imao veliki broj zaposlenih, a imao je i punu podršku policije kako bi se što efikasnije sprovele sve njegove odluke. Vagnerov posao je bio da “stabilizuje” cene; kako cene sirovina, tako i cene finalnih proizvoda.
Vagner je mogao da zamrzne cene, ali nije mogao da spreči niti rast proizvodnih troškova, niti nestašicu proizvoda čiju je cenu “stabilizovao”.
Kao posledica stabilizacije cena javlja se velika nestašica proizvoda, a sa nestašicom proizvoda dolazi do fenomena prodaje vezanih proizvoda. Kada kupac dođe kod prodavca sa namerom da kupi neki proizvod, recimo, čeličnu žicu, onda on dobije sledeći odgovor: “Žao nam je, ali velika je nestašica čelika, tako da ne znamo kada ćemo biti u mogućnosti da vam je isporučimo. Ali, mogli bismo vam odmah isporučiti odrvrtače izrađene od nove legure.” To u prevodu znači: čeličnu žicu možete dobiti samo ako istovremeno kupite i nešto što vam ne treba a čija cena još nije stabilizovana.
Birokratija
Sa rastom sistema kontrole – paralelno je rasla i birokratija. Čak i najmanji zanatlija je morao da čita dugačka cirkularna pisma i da popunjava na desetine upitnika. Primera radi, samo jedno takvo pismo, koje je poslato svim samostalnim zanatlijama u Nemačkoj, zahtevalo je brižljive odgovore na čak trideset i jedno pitanje.
Novi sistem je imao svoje predstavnike u obliku veoma moćne birokratije koja nije bila posebno zainteresovana za odbranu niti jednog sistema – jedino što je njih stvarno interesovalo je – odbrana svoje apsolutne moći.
Činovnici, naučeni da samo izvršavaju naređenja, nemaju ni želje, ni sredstava, ni vizije za promenom postojećih pravila. Državne birokrate postojeća pravila sprovode kruto i mehanički, ne obazirući se na vitalne interese onih koji su neophodni činioci nacionalne ekonomije. Jedini način promene slova zakona je bio mito; protiv krutih zakona koji su uništavali njihova preduzeća biznismeni su se mogli boriti samo podmićivanjem.
U takvom poslovnom okruženju, ako biznismen želi da sačuva svoj biznis – on mora kršiti zakone jer je nemoguće ispoštovati sve ono što mu je naređeno od strane bezbrojnih državnih institucija. Možemo navesti neke od tih institucija:
Ministarstvo ekonomije, Komesarijat za četvorogodišnje planove, Devizni odbor, dvadeset pet Odbora za kontrolu uvoza, Komesarijat za kontrolu cena, Državna uprava za Ekonomski razvoj, Državna uprava za eksploataciju zemljišta, Državna uprava za korišćenje otpadnog materijala, Uprava za obnovu, Uprava za radnička pitanja, Komesarijat za građevinarstvo, Komesarijat za automobilsku industriju, Komesarijat za mašinsku industriju, Komesarijat za elektroprivredu, Ministarstvo poljoprivrede, Razni forumi i odbori za monopole i marketing, Ministarstvo rada, Radnički front, Razmena radnika, Regionalni radnički poverenici, Rajhsbanka, Centralni odbor banaka, Odeljenje za strane valute, Privredna komora, mnogobrojna Strukovna udruženja, mnogobrojna Regionalna udruženja, Regionalne privredne komore, Ratno veće, Uprava za samopomoć nemačke industrije, Fond za izvozne subvencije itd.
Sa rastom birokratije neminovno dolazi i do sukoba nadležnosti jer je svaka birokratska institucija tvrdila da je ono što ona radi u interesu države, a sve to zajedno je dovelo do potpunog haosa u pogledu: žalbi, istraga, beskonačne prepiske i slično, a kao rešenje za izlazak iz birokratskog haosa ponuđeno je – šta drugo do – kreiranje novih birokratskih institucija sa još većim ovlašćenjima. Osnovana su tri nova komesarijata koja su odgovarala direktno Geringu. Zarad koordinacije svih tih državnih institucija i ustanova, ekonomski diktator, maršal Gering, osnovao je državni komesarijat ali je to dovelo samo do još većeg nezadovoljstva. Reforma je donekle rešila problem “rata papirima” između mnogobrojnih birokratskih institucija, ali nije rešila, niti je mogla da reši, najveći problem – problem ponude i tražnje sirovina.
Totalitarno društvo izaziva neodgovornost kod tog uvek-rastućeg privilegovanog dela društva. Njihova pozicija je sigurna, osim ako se, zbog međusobnog rivalstva, ne nađu na udaru svojih prijatelja. Njihov rad ni na koji način ne doprinosi povećanju životnog standarda društva, a sav njihov posao se svodi samo na jedno – kako sačuvati svoj posao. Zadatak svih ostalih se sastoji u služenju te nezasite birokratske klike.
Fabrički lideri
U nacističkoj Nemačkoj su postojali i menadžeri ili tzv. “fabrički lideri”, čija je uloga više nego kontradiktorna. Sa jedne strane, fabrički lider je imao daleko veću vlast nego ikada ranije jer su se sva njegova naređenja morala bespogovorno izvršiti, dok je sa druge strane taj isti neprikosnoveni fabrički lider bio samo beskrajno mali šraf jedne ogromne državno-vojne mašinerije. Fabrički lider je morao izvršavati naređenja koja dolaze od strane partijskih i vojnih starešina, ali je u isto vreme samo on bio odgovoran za ispunjenje proizvodnih planova. Sa jedne strane, on više nije samo obični biznismen već je i predstavnik države, a sa druge stane, ako dođe do bilo kakvog problema, veoma se lako moglo desiti da bude proglašen nesposobnim za obavljanje funkcije lidera.
Bankari kao državni službenici
Kao i svi drugi vlasnici kapitala, i bankari su u nacističkoj Nemačkoj imali dvostruku ulogu: oni su vlasnici banke ali su istovremeno i “predstavnici države”. Samo su naivni investitori mogli imati poverenje u te “nove bankare”, jer je tada svaki bankar imao vernu senku u obliku nekog partijskog predstavnika koji je budno motrio na svaki njegov potez.
Svaki bankar je tada svojim klijentima savetovao samo jedno: kupujte državne obveznice ili obveznice preduzeća četvorogodišnjeg plana. Osim toga, suprotno onome što je stvarno mislio, svaki bankar je morao zračiti optimizmom u pogledu finansijske situacije u državi. Ako investitor odbije savet bankara, onda ga bankar može dodatno posavetovati da je najbolje da novac uopšte ne investira, već da ga ostavi na bankovnom računu. Ako investitor odbije i taj savet i podigne veću sumu novca, onda je bankar bio dužan da o tome obavesti vlast. Od tog momenta brigu o investitoru su na sebe preuzimali partija i policija.
Fuzija banaka i države
Mnogo propalih nacističkih proizvođača koji su ozbiljno shvatili partijski program protiv “kamatnog ropstva” i “neproduktivnog bankarskog kapitala”, išli su kod “jevrejskih bankara” i tražili kredit, odbijajući da ponude bilo kakvu garanciju za uzeti kredit i odbijajući da daju bilo kakve dokaze o svom finansijskom statusu. Pod sve većim pritiskom ultra–nacista, 1934. godine, donet je zakon koji sve privatne banke obavezuje da pojedincima i privatnim firmama, bez osiguranja, odobre kredit od 5.000 maraka.
Centralna banka je postala produžena ruka države. U to vreme predsednik Rajhsbanke je bio Hjalmar Šaht. Šahtu je bilo jasno da se ogromni državni deficit ne može u nedogled održavati i zato je pokušao da skreše državne rashode, da smanji uticaj partijske birokratije, da ohrabri ličnu inicijativu i konkurenciju, da spreči dalju kreditnu ekspanziju i da spreči dalji rast poreza. Šaht je imao saveznike u redovima visokih vojnih oficira koji su se takođe protivili potpunoj kontroli partijske birokratije i državne tajne policije. Međutim, partija je mislila drugačije: neće biti nikakvih restrikcija, niti će neki autsajderi podrivati autoritet partije.
Kada je Šaht konačno shvatio o čemu se tu stvarno radi, on u svom govoru, 16. avgusta 1935, otvoreno napada partijske lidere i naziva ih “neozbiljnim diletantima”. Gebels zabranjuje objavljivanje tog govora, ali je Šaht odlučio da ga odštampa i distribuira uz pomoć Rajhsbanke. Šaht je napustio Rajhsbanku tek kada je izgubio bilo kakav uticaj, a na njegovo mesto dolazi Rudolf Brinkman, kome očigledno još nije bilo sasvim jasno da je Rajhsbanka bila pod potpunom kontrolom vlasti. Ubrzo nakon njegovog imenovanja za predsednika Rajhsbanke Brinkman daje ostavku zbog, po nacističkoj verziji, “nervnog sloma i gubitka pamćenja”. Iz jednog francuskog časopisa saznajemo da su uzrok Brinkmanovog nervnog sloma njegove reči:
Mi u Nemačkoj plaćamo jedan pištolj po ceni za deset pištolja, i još je taj jedan pištolj lošijeg kvaliteta. Naša valuta je isrpljena; i mi dobro znamo da se državni prihodi putem poreza više ne mogu povećati.
Samo tri dana nakon tog govora Brinkman odlazi u penziju zbog “gubitka pamćenja”.
Preduzetnici
Situacija sa kojom su se suočili investitori u nacističkoj Nemačkoj ličila je na pravu tragediju i grotesku. U želji da izbegnu rizik, investitori su svoj novac investirali u državne fondove, a onda im je taj novac država oduzela i investirala u naoružanje. Banke, štedionice i osiguravajuće kompanije su morale da kupuju državne obveznice i blagajničke zapise, tako da je, u stvari, njihova imovina bila – državni dug. Vlasnici kapitala su morali da finansiraju državne investicije, što nam ujedno i objašnjava kako je bilo moguće da nacistička Nemačka troši ogromne količine novca i finansira masivni deficit, a da ipak ne dođe do munjevitog i potpunog sloma ekonomije.
Potpuno je jasno da čitav taj proces vodi ka potpunom razaranju proizvodnih kompanija i preduzetništva, dok u isto vreme njihova mesta zauzimaju neproizvodna državna radna mesta. Rejman to objašnjava sledećim rečima:
Dok pravi nezavisni biznismeni polako nestaju, ovi drugi cvetaju. Oni se bogate putem partijskih veza, a i oni sami su takođe članovi partije i odani fireru. Oni su povezani porodičnim i partijskim vezama i zato su u milosti birokratije. U mnogim slučajevima celokupno bogatstvo tih “partijskih kapitalista” je nastalo putem gole sile. U njihovom je interesu da jačaju partiju koja je ojačala njih.
(kraj prvog dela)
Radivoje Ognjanović je ekonomista iz Beograda. Ostale tekstove ovog autora možete pogledati ovde.
- Radivoje Ognjanović: Dekodirani kejnzijanizam []
- Ludwig von Mises: Omnipotent Government []
- Ludwig von Mises: Planned Chaos []
- Julien Benda: The Treason of the Intellectuals []
- Hermann Rauschning: Moji poverljivi razgovori sa Hitlerom []
- Ludwig von Mises: Interventionism []
- Radivoje Ognjanović: Atak na logiku i razum []
- Radivoje Ognjanović: Liberalizam []
- Radivoje Ognjanović: Ekonomija i pseudoekonomija []
- Ludwig von Mises: Human action []
- Günter Reimann: The Vampire Economy []
RADIVOJE OGNJANOVIĆ · 30/06/2014
Interesantno a I cudnovato kako dans mladi i obrazovani stvaraju neke svoje iluzije o Fasizmu uporedjujuci ga sa Socializmom? Ako se malo vise pozavabimo studijama kao sto su ljudi koji su se studiozno posvetili drustvenim poredcima npr. Dr. Michael Perrente ili Noam Chomsky, dolazimo do saznanja da Fasizam I Scializam su dva sasvim razlicita pojma. Socializam je drustveno uredjenje u kome su ljudska prva daleko vise zastupljena nego demokratija cija formula se moze zasnivati na mnogobrojne razlicite definicije. Prema tome smatram da nebi trebali mesati „babe I zabe“ nema apsolutno nikakve logike, a najmanje neke varijnte.
Sviđa mi seSviđa mi se
skolska i neostrascena analiza pokazuje da je razlika izmedju fasizma i socijalima samo u vlasnistvu nad sredstvima za proizvodnju. U socijalizmu ona su u vlasnistvu drustva i njima upravlja drzava a u fasizmu ona ostaju privatno vlasnistvo ali njima takodje drzava upravlja po potrebi i nahodjenju. Dakle u konacnici se svodi na isto. Jedino sto kod fasizma nema oduzimanja privatne imovine i vlasnistva nad sredstvima za proizvodnju unapred vec se to radi po potrebi.
Sviđa mi seSviđa mi se
Parenti i Chomski su socijalisti ali oni ne podrzavaju Socijalizam kakav Srbija poznaje. Oni su protiv korporativnog kapitalizma ali su takodje za slobodno preduzetnistvo. Ni Comski ni Parenti ne zgovaraju jaku drzavu, naprotiv..Comski je anarho-socijalista
Sviđa mi seSviđa mi se
Socijalna zajednica za koju se zalazu ova dva uvazena profesora (Comski i Parenti) bliska je obliku zajednice kojoj DRZAVA NIJE TUTOR; na primer ona zajednica koju je Margaret Mid opisala u Sazrevanju na Samoi. LJudska prava na kojima profesori insistiraju kao neotudjivim i bez drzavnih represija su nalik na ona koja su davnih sezdesetih godina opisana u knjizi Slobodna deca Samerhila. Zasto deca ? Zato sto ako deca prinudno nauce da je robovanje u stvari sloboda onda ona kada postanu ljudi kroz represiju i agresivno ponasanje namecu tu „slobodu“ drugima. Nijedna drzava ne dopusta ljudska prava ukoliko je -drzavni poredak- ugrozen. Dakle svaka drzava ima za imperativ sopstveni opstanak zvala se ona socijalisticka, kapitalisticka, demokratska, diktatorska …..
Sviđa mi seSviđa mi se
Tuesday, November 21, 2006
Noam Chomsky lecture from 1970 (!) — full text transcript
Government in the Future. Poetry Center, New York. February 16, 1970.
Download and listen to the mp3 file:
[audio src="http://www.chomsky.info/audionvideo/19700216.mp3" /]
ANNOUNCER: The sound seminar you are about to hear was recorded at the Poetry Center of the New York YM-YWHA on February 16, 1970. This program presents Noam Chomsky, speaking on „Government in the Future“. Here is Noam Chomsky. [00:19]
CHOMSKY: I think it is useful to setup as a framework for discussion four somewhat idealized positions with regard to the role of the state in an advanced industrial society. I want to call these positions 1) classical liberal, 2) libertarian socialist, 3) state socialist, 4) state capitalist and I want to consider each in turn. [00:43]
Also, I’d like to make clear my own point in advance, so that you can evaluate and judge what I am saying. I think that the libertarian socialist concepts, and by that I mean a range of thinking that extends from left-wing Marxism through anarchism, I think that these are fundamentally correct and that they are the proper and natural extension of classical liberalism into the era of advanced industrial society. In contrast, it seems to me that the ideology of state socialism, that is, what has become of Bolshevism, and of state capitalism, the modern welfare state, these of course are dominant in the industrial countries, in the industrial societies, but I believe that they are regressive and highly inadequate social theories, and that a large number of our really fundamental problems stem from a kind of incompatibility and inappropriateness of these social forms to a modern industrial society. [01:39]
Well then let me consider these four points of reference in sequence, beginning with the classical liberal point of view.
## Classical Liberalism [01:50]
Classical liberalism asserts as its major idea an opposition to all but the most restricted and minimal forms of state intervention in personal or social life. Well this conclusion is quite familiar, however the reasoning that leads to it is less familiar and, I think, a good deal more important than the conclusion itself. [02:13]
One of the earliest and most brilliant expositions of this position is in Wilhelm Von Humboldt’s „Limits of State Action“, which was written in 1792, though not published for 60 or 70 years after that. In his view: „The state tends to make man an instrument to serve its arbitrary ends, overlooking his individual purposes. And, since man is in his essence a free, searching, self-perfecting being, it follows that the state is a profoundly anti-human institution.“ That is, its actions, its existence, are ultimately incompatible with the full harmonious development of human potential in it’s richest diversity. Hence incompatible with what Humboldt, and in the following century Marx, Bakunin, Mill, and many others, what they see as the true end of man. And for the record I think that this is an accurate description. [03:07]
The modern conservative tends to regard himself as the lineal descendant of the classical liberal in this sense, but I think that can be maintained only from an extremely superficial point of view, as one can see by studying more carefully the fundamental ideas of classical libertarian thought as expressed, in my opinion, in its most profound form by Humboldt. [03:30]
I think the issues are of really quite considerable contemporary significance, and if you don’t mind what may appear to be a somewhat antiquabrian excursion, I’d like to expand on them. [03:41]
For Humboldt as for Rousseau, and before him the Cartesians, man’s central attribute is his freedom. „To enquire and to create, these are the centers around which all human pursuits more or less directly revolve.“ „But,“ he goes on to say, „all moral cultures spring solely and immediately from the inner life of the soul and can never be produced by external and artificial contrivances. The cultivation of the understanding, as of any man’s other faculties, is generally achieved by his own activity, his own ingenuity, or his own methods of using the discoveries of others.“ [04:16]
Well, from these assumptions, quite obviously, an educational theory follows and he develops it, but I won’t pursue it. But also far more follows. Humboldt goes on to develop at least the rudiments of a theory of exploitation and of alienated labour that suggests in significant ways, I think, the early Marx. Humboldt in fact continues these comments that I quoted, about the cultivation of the understanding through spontaneous action, in the following way: He says, „Man never regards what he possesses as so much his own, as what he does and the laborer who tends the garden is perhaps in a truer sense its owner, than the listless voluptuary who enjoys its fruits. And since truly human action is that which flows from inner impulse, it seems as if all peasants and craftsmen might be elevated into artists, that is men who love their labor for its own sake, improve it by their own plastic genius and inventive skill, and thereby cultivate their intellect, ennoble their character, and exult and refine their pleasures; and so humanity would be ennobled by the very things which now, though beautiful in themselves, so often go to degrade it.“ „Freedom is undoubtedly the indispensable condition without which even the pursuits most congenial to individual human nature can never succeed in producing such salutary influences. Whatever does not spring from a man’s free choice, or is only the result of instruction and guidance, does not enter into his very being but remains alien to his true nature. He does not perform it with truly human energies, but merely with mechanical exactness. And if a man acts in a mechanical way, reacting to external demands or instruction, rather than in ways determined by his own interests and energies and power,“ he says, „we may admire what he does, but we despise what he is.“ [06:04]
For Humboldt then, man is born to enquire and create, and when a man or a child chooses to enquire or create out of its own free choice, then he becomes, in his own terms, „an artist rather than a tool of production or a well trained parrot“. This is the essence of his concept of human nature. And I think that it is very revealing and interesting compared with Marx, with the early Marx manuscripts, and particularly his account of „the alienation of labour when work is external to the worker, not part of his nature, so that he does not fulfill himself in his work but denies himself and is physically exhausted and mentally debased. This alienated labour that casts some of the workers back into a barbarous kind of work and turns others into machines, thus depriving man of his species character, of free conscious activity and productive life.“ Recall also Marx’s well known and often quoted reference to a higher form of society, in which labour has become not only a means of life but also the highest want in life. And recall also his repeated criticism of the specialized labour which, „mutilates the worker into a fragment of a human being, degrades him to become a mere appurtenance of the machine, makes his work such a torment that its essential meaning is destroyed, estranges from him the intellectual potentialities of the labour process in very proportion to the extent to which science is incorporated into it as an independent power.“ [07:37]
Robert Tucker for one has rightly emphasized that Marx sees the revolutionary more as a frustrated producer, than as a dis-satisfied consumer. And this, far more radical, critique of capitalist relations of production, flows directly, often in the same words, from the libertarian thought of The Enlightenment. For this reason, I think, one must say that classical liberal ideas, in their essence though not in the way they developed, are profoundly anti-capitalist. The essence of these ideas must be destroyed for them to serve as an ideology of modern industrial capitalism. [08:13]
Writing in the 1780’s and early 1790’s, Humboldt had no conception of the forms that industrial capitalism would take. Consequently, in this classic of classical liberalism, he stresses the problem of limiting state power, and he is not overly concerned with the dangers of private power. The reason is that he believes in and speaks of the essential equality of condition of private citizens, and of course he has no idea, writing in 1790, of the ways in which the notion of private person would come to be reinterpreted in the era of corporate capitalism. „He did not foresee“, I now quote the anarchist historian Rudolf Rocker: „he did not foresee that democracy, with its model of equality of all citizens before the law, and liberalism, with its right of man over his own person, both would be wrecked on the realities of capitalistic economy.“ Humboldt did not foresee that in a predatory capitalistic economy, state intervention would be an absolute necessity. To preserve human existence. To prevent the destruction of the physical environment. I speak optimistically of course. [09:18]
As Karl Polanyi for one has pointed out: „The self-adjusting market could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society. It would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness.“ I think that’s correct. Humboldt also did not foresee the consequences of the commodity character of labor. The doctrine, again in Polanyi’s words, „that it is not for the commodity to decide where it should be offered for sale, to what purpose it should be used, at what price it should be allowed to change hands, in what manner it should be consumed or destroyed.“ But the commodity in this case is of course human life. And social protection was therefore a minimal necessity to constrain the irrational and destructive workings of the classical free market. [10:03]
Nor did Humboldt understand in 1790 that capitalistic economic relations perpetuated a form of bondage which, long before that in fact, as early as 1767, Simon Linguet had declared to be „even worse than slavery,“ writing :“it is the impossibility of living by any other means that compels our farm labourers to till the soil, whose fruits they will not eat, and our masons to construct buildings in which they will not live. It is want that drags them to those markets where they await masters, who will do them the kindness of buying them. It is want that compels them to go down on their knees to the rich man in order to get from him permission to enrich him. What effective gain has the suppression of slavery brought him? ‘He is free,’ you say. That is his misfortune. These men, it is said, have no master. They have one, and the most terrible, the most imperious of masters: that is, need. It is this that that reduces them to the most cruel dependence.“ And if there is something degrading to human nature in the idea of bondage, as every spokesman for the enlightenment would insist, then it would follow that a new emancipation must be awaited, what Fourier referred to as the third and last emancipatory phase of history. The first having made serfs out of slaves, the second wage earners out of serfs and the third which will transform the proletariat freemen by eliminating the commodity character of labour, ending wage slavery and bringing the commercial, industrial and financial institutions, under democratic control. [11:28]
These are all things that Humboldt in his classical liberal doctrine did not express and didn’t see, but I think that he might have accepted these conclusions. He does, for example, agree that state intervention in social life is legitimate „if freedom would destroy the very conditions without which not only freedom but even existence itself would be inconceivable“ which are precisely the circumstances that arise in an unconstrained capitalist economy and he does, as in remarks that I quoted, vigorously condemn the alienation of labour. In any event, his criticism of bureaucracy and the autocratic state stands as a very eloquent forewarning of some of the most dismal aspects of modern history, and the important point is that the basis of his critique is applicable to a far broader range of coercive institutions than he imagined, in particular to the institutions of industrial capitalism. [12:21]
Though he expresses a classical liberal doctrine, Humboldt is no primitive individualist, in the style of for example Rousseau. So Rousseau extols the savage who lives within himself, but Humboldt’s vision is entirely different. He sums up his remarks as follows, he says „the whole tenor of the ideas and arguments unfolded in this essay might fairly be reduced to this: that while they would break all fetters in human society, they would attempt to find as many new social bonds as possible. The isolated man is no more able to develop than the one who is fettered.“ and he in fact looks forwards to a community of free association, without coercion by the state or other authoritarian institutions, in which free men can create and inquire, achieve the highest development of their powers. In fact, far ahead of his time, he presents an anarchist vision that is appropriate, perhaps, to the next stage of industrial society. We can perhaps look forward to a day, when these various strands will be brought together within the framework of libertarian socialism, a social form that barely exists today, though its elements can perhaps be perceived, for example in the guarantee of individual rights, that has achieved so far its fullest realization (though still tragically flawed in the western democracies), or in the Israeli kibbutzim, or in the experiments with workers’ councils in Yugoslavia, or in the effort to awaken popular consciousness and to create a new involvement in the social process, which is a fundamental element in the third world revolutions, coexisting uneasily with indefensible authoritarian practice. [14:07]
So let me summarize this first point. The first point of the state that I want to setup as a reference, classical liberal, its doctrine is that the state function should be drastically limited, but this familiar characterization is a very superficial one. More deeply, the classical liberal view develops from a certain concept of human nature: one that stresses the importance of diversity and free creation. And therefore this view is in fundamental opposition to industrial capitalism, with its wage slavery, its alienated labour and its hierarchic and authoritarian principles of social and economic organisation. At least in its Humboldtian form, classical liberal thought is opposed as well to the concepts of possessive individualism, which are intrinsic to capitalist ideology. So it seeks to eliminate social fetters, but to replace them by social bonds, not by competitive greed, not by predatory individualism, not of course by corporate empires, state or private. Classical libertarian thought seems to me therefore to lead directly to libertarian socialism or anarchism, if you like, when combined with an understanding of industrial capitalism. [15:17]
## Libertarian Socialism
Well the second point of reference that I want to discuss is the libertarian socialist vision of the state. A French writer rather sympathetic to anarchism once wrote that „anarchism has a broad back, like paper it endures anything“ and there are many shades of anarchism and I am concerned here only with one, namely the anarchism of Bakunin, who wrote in his anarchist manifesto of 1865 that „to be an anarchist one must first be a socialist“. I am concerned with the anarchism of Adolph Fisher, one of the martyrs of the Haymarket affair in 1886, who said that every anarchist is a socialist, but not every socialist is necessarily an anarchist. [15:57]
A consistent anarchist must oppose private ownership of the means of production. Such property is indeed, as Proudhon in his famous remark asserted, a form of theft. But a consistent anarchist will also oppose the organisation of production by government. I’m quoting: „it means state socialism, the command of the state officials over production and the command of managers, scientists, shop officials, in the shop. The goal of the working class is liberation from exploitation and this goal is not reached and cannot be reached by a new directing and governing class substituting itself for the bourgeoisie. It is only realized by the workers themselves being the master of production by some form of workers’ councils.“ These remarks, it happens, are quoted from the left wing Marxist Anton Pannekoek and in fact radical Marxism, what Lenin once called infantile ultra leftism, merges with anarchist currents. [16:53]
This is an important point, I think, and let me give one further illustration of this convergence between left wing marxism and socialist anarchism. Considering the following characterization of revolutionary socialism: „the revolutionary socialist denies that state ownership can end in anything other than a bureaucratic despotism. We have seen why the state cannot democratically control industry. Industry can only be democratically owned and controlled by workers electing, directly from their own ranks, industrial administrative committees. Socialism will be fundamentally an industrial system. Its constituencies will be of an industrial character. Thus, those carrying on the social activity and industries of society will be directly represented in the local and central councils of social administration. In this way the powers of such delegates will flow upwards from those carrying on the work and conversant with the needs of the community. When the central administrative industrial committee meets, it will represent every phase of social activity. Hence the capitalist political or geographical state will be replaced by the industrial administrative committee of socialism. The transition from one social system to the other will be the social revolution. The political state throughout history has meant the government of men by ruling classes. The republic of socialism will be the government of industry, administered on behalf of the whole community. The former meant the economic and political subjection of the many, the latter will mean the economic freedom of all. It will be therefore a true democracy.“ [18:24]
These remarks are taken from a book called „The State: Its Origins and Function“, written by William Paul in early 1917, just prior to Lenin’s „State and Revolution“, which is his most libertarian work. William Paul is one of the founders of the British communist party, later the editor of British communist party journal. And it is interesting that his critique of state socialism resembles very closely, I think, the libertarian doctrine of the anarchists, in particular in its principle that the state must disappear, to be replaced by the industrial organisation of society in the course of the social revolution itself. Proudhon, in 1851, wrote that what we put in place of the government is industrial organisation and many many similar comments can be cited. That, in essence, is the fundamental idea of anarchist revolutionaries. [19:13]
What’s more important than the fact that many such statements can be cited, is that these ideas have been realised in spontaneous revolutionary action several times, for example in Germany and Italy after the first World War, in Catalonia in 1936. One might argue, at least I would argue, that council communism in this sense, in the sense of the long quotation that I read, is the natural form of revolutionary socialism in an industrial society. It reflects the intuitive understanding that democracy is largely a sham when the industrial system is controlled by any form of autocratic elite, whether of owners, managers, technocrats, vanguard party, a state bureaucracy or whatever. Under these conditions of authoritarian domination, the classical liberal ideals, which are expressed also by Marx and Bakunin and all true revolutionaries cannot be realised. Man will, in other words, not be free to enquire and create, to develop his own potentialities to their fullest, the worker will remain a fragment of a human being, degraded, a tool in the productive process directed from above. [20:18]
And the ideas of revolutionary libertarian socialism in this sense, they have been submerged in the industrial societies of the past half century. The dominant ideologies have been those of state socialism and state capitalism. But there has been an interesting resurgence in the last couple of years. In fact, the thesis that I quoted from Anton Pannekoek, these were taken from a recent pamphlet of a radical French workers group and the quotation that I read from William Paul on revolutionary socialism was taken from a paper by Walter Kendall at the national conference on workers’ control in Sheffield, England, last March. Both of these groups, the French and the English one, represent something significant. The workers’ control movement in England, in particular, has developed into a, I think, remarkably significant force in the last few years. It includes some of the largest trade unions for example. The Amalgamated Engineering Federation [probably „Amalgamated Engineering Union“]
, which I think is the second largest trade union in England and which has taken these principles as its fundamental ideas. It has had a series of successful conferences putting out an interesting pamphlet literature and on the continent there are parallel developments. May 1968 in France of course accelerated the growing interest in council communism and similar ideas and other forms of libertarian socialism in France and Germany as it did in England. [21:39]
Given the general conservative cast of our highly ideological society, it is not too surprising that the United States is relatively untouched by these currents. But that too may change. The erosion of the Cold War mythology, at least makes it possible to discuss some of these questions and if the present wave of repression can be beaten back, if the left can overcome its more suicidal tendencies and build on the achievements of the past decade, the problem of how to organize industrial society on truly democratic lines, with democratic control in the workplace as well as in the community, this should become the dominant intellectual issue for those who are alive to the problems of contemporary society. And, as a mass movement for revolutionary libertarian socialism develops, as I hope it will, speculation should proceed to action. [22:28]
It may seem quixotic to group left marxism and anarchism under the same rubric as I have done, given the antagonism throughout the past century between Marxists and anarchists, beginning with the antagonism between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and, for example, Proudhon and Bakunin on the other. In the nineteenth century, at least, their differences with regard to the question of the state was significant, but in a sense it was tactical. The anarchists were convinced that capitalism and the state must be destroyed together. Engels, in a letter of 1883, expressed his opposition to this idea as follows: „The anarchists put the thing upside down. They declare that the proletarian revolution must begin by doing away with the political organisation of the state. But to destroy it at such a moment would be to destroy the only organism by means of which the victorious proletariat can assert its newly conquered power, hold down its adversaries and carry out that economic revolution of society without which the whole victory must end in a new defeat and in a mass slaughter of the workers, similar to those after the Paris commune“. Now the Paris commune, I think it is fair to say, did represent the ideas of libertarian socialism, of anarchism if you like, and Marx, of course, wrote about it with great enthusiasm. In fact, the experience of the commune led him to modify his concept of the role of the state, as you can see, for examples, by looking at the introduction to the „Communist Manifesto“, the edition of which was published in 1872, and to take on something like a more anarchist perspective of the nature of social revolution. [24:03]
Well the commune was of course drowned in blood, as the anarchist communes of Spain were destroyed by fascist and communist armies. And it might be argued that a more dictatorial structures would have defended the revolution against such forces. But I doubt this very much. At least in the case of Spain, it seems to me that a more consistent libertarian policy might have provided the only possible defense of the revolution. Of course this can be contested and it is a long story, which I do not want to go into here, but at the very least it is clear that one would have to be rather naive after the events of the past half century to fail to see the truth in Bakunin’s repeated warnings that the Red bureaucracy would prove the most violent, terrible lie of the century. He once said „take the most radical revolutionary and place his on the throne of all Russia“, he said in 1870, „or give him a dictatorial power and before a year has passed he will become worse than the Czar himself.“ I’m afraid, in this respect, Bakunin was all too perceptive and this kind of warning was repeatedly voiced from the left. For example the anarcho-syndicalist Fernand Pelloutier asked, in the 1890s: „Must even the transitory state to which we have to submit necessarily and fatally be the collectivist jail ? Can’t it consist in a free organisation, limited exclusively by the needs of production and consumption, all political institutions having disappeared ?“ [25:28]
I don’t pretend to know the answer to that question, but I think that it is tolerably clear, that unless the answer is positive, the chances for a truly democratic revolution that will achieve the humanistic ideals of the left are perhaps rather slight. I think Martin Buber put the problem quite succinctly when he said: „One cannot in the nature of things expect a little tree, that has been turned into a club, to put forth leaves.“ For just this reason, it’s essential that a powerful revolutionary movement exist in the United States, if there are to be any reasonable possibilities for democratic social change of a radical sort anywhere in the capitalist world. And comparable remarks, I think, undoubtedly hold for the Russian empire. Lenin, till the end of his life, stressed the idea that: „It is an elementary truth of Marxism that the victory of socialism requires the joint effort of workers in a number of advanced countries. At the very least it requires that the great centers of world imperialism be impeded by domestic pressures from counter revolutionary intervention. Only such possibilities will permit any revolution to overthrow its own coercive state institutions as it tries to bring the economy under direct democratic control.“ [26:43]
Well, let me summarize briefly again. I have mentioned so far two reference points for discussion of the state: Classical Liberalism and Libertarian Socialism. They are in agreement that the functions of the state are repressive and that state action must be limited. The libertarian socialist goes on to insist that the state power must be eliminated in favour of the democratic organisation of industrial society, with direct popular control over all institutions by those who participate in, as well as those who are directly affected by, the workings of these institutions. So one might imagine then, a system of workers’ councils, consumers’ councils, commune assemblies, regional federations and so on, with the kind of representation that is direct and revocable, in the sense that representatives are directly answerable to and return directly to the well defined and integrated social group for which they speak in some higher order organisation, something obviously very different than our system of representation. [27:40]
Now it might very well be asked whether such a social structure is feasible, in a complex, highly technological society. There are counter arguments and I think they fall into two main categories. First category is that such an organisation is contrary to human nature, and the second category says roughly that it is incompatible with the demands of efficiency. I’d like to briefly consider each of these. [28:03]
Consider the first, that a free society is contrary to human nature. It is often asked: do men really want freedom ? Do they want the responsibility that goes with it ? Or would they prefer to be ruled by a benevolent master ? Consistently, apologists for the existing distribution of power have held to one or another version of the idea of the happy slave. Two hundred years ago, Rousseau denounced the sophistic politicians and intellectuals „who search for ways to obscure the fact,“ so he maintained, „that the essential and the defining property of man is his freedom. They attribute to man a natural inclination to servitude, without thinking that it is the same for freedom as for innocence and virtue. Their value is felt only as long as one enjoys them oneself, and the taste for them is lost, as soon as one has lost them.“ As proof of this doctrine he refers to the marvels done by all free peoples to guard themselves from oppression. „True“, he says, „those who have abandoned the life of a free man do nothing but boast incessantly of the peace and repose they enjoy in their chains. But when I see the other sacrifice pleasures, repose, wealth, power and life itself for the preservation of this sole good, which is so disdained by those who have lost it, when I see multitudes of entirely naked savages scorn European voluptuousness and endure hunger, fire, the sword and death to preserve only their independence, I feel it does not behoove slaves to reason about freedom. A comment to which we can perhaps give a contemporary interpretation. [29:36]
Rather similar thoughts were expressed by Kant 40 years later, „he cannot“, he says, „accept the proposition that certain people are not right for freedom, for example the serfs of some landlord.“ „If one accepts this assumption,“ he writes, „freedom will never be achieved. For one cannot arrive at the maturity for freedom without having already acquired it. One must be free to learn how to make use of ones powers freely and usefully. The first attempts will surely be brutal and will lead to a state of affairs more painful and dangerous than the former condition. Under the dominance but also the protection of an external authority. However, one can achieve reason only through one’s own experiences and one must be free to be able to undertake them. To accept the principle that freedom is worthless for those under one’s control and that one has the right to refuse it to them forever, is an infringement on the right of God himself, who has created man to be free.“ [30:29]
This particular remark is interesting because of its context as well. Kant, in this case, was defending the French revolution during the terror, against those who claimed it showed the masses to be unready for the privilege of freedom. And his remarks too, I think, have obvious contemporary relevance. No rational person will approve of violence and terror, and in particular the terror of the post-revolutionary state, which has fallen into the hands of a grim autocracy, has more than once reached indescribable levels of savagery. At the same time no person of understanding or humanity will too quickly condemn the violence that often occurs, when long subdued masses rise against their oppressors or take their first steps towards liberty and social reconstruction. [31:17]
Humboldt, just a few years before Kant, had expressed a view very similar to that. He also said that freedom and variety are the preconditions for human self-realization. „Nothing promotes this ripeness for freedom so much as freedom itself. This truth, perhaps, may not be acknowledged by those who have so often used this unripeness as an excuse for continuing repression, but it seems to me to follow unquestionably from the very nature of man. The incapacity for freedom can only arise from a want of moral and intellectual power. To heighten this power is the only way to supply the want, but to do so presupposes the freedom, which awakens spontaneous activity.“ „Those who do not comprehend this“, he says, „may justly be suspected of misunderstanding human nature, and wishing to make men into machines.“ [32:01]
Rosa Luxemburg’s fraternal, sympathetic critique of Bolshevik ideology and practice was given in very similar terms. Only the active participation of the masses in self-government and social reconstruction could bring about what she described as the complete spiritual transformation in the masses degraded by centuries of bourgeois class rule, just as only their creative experience and spontaneous action can solve the myriad problems of creating a libertarian socialist society. She went on to say that historically the errors committed by a truly revolutionary movement are infinitely more fruitful than the infallibility of the cleverest central committee, and I think that these remarks can be translated immediately for the somewhat parallel ideology of the soulful corporation, which is now fairly popular among the American academics. For example Karl Casen who writes: „no longer the agent of proprietorship seeking to maximize return on investment, management sees itself as responsible to stock holders, employees, customers, the general public and perhaps most important the firm itself as an institution. There is no display of greed or graspingness, there is no attempt to push off on the workers and the community at large part of the social costs of the enterprise. The modern corporation is a soulful corporation.“ [laughter]
Similarly, the vanguard party is a soulful party, and in both cases those who urge that men submit to the rule of these benevolent autocracies may, I think, justly be accused of wishing to make men into machines. [33:33]
Now the correctness of the view which is expressed by Rousseau and Kant and Humboldt and Luxemburg and innumerable others, I don’t think that the correctness of this is for the moment susceptible to scientific proof. One can only evaluate it in terms of experience and intuition. One can also point out the social consequences of adopting the view that men are born to be free, or that they are born to be ruled by benevolent autocrats. [33:57]
What of the second question, the question of efficiency ? Is democratic control of the industrial system down to its smallest functional units incompatible with efficiency ? This is very frequently argued on several grounds. Some say, for example, that centralized management is a technological imperative, but I think the argument is exceedingly weak when one looks into it. The very same technology that brings relevant information to the board of managers can bring it at the time that it is needed to everyone in the work force. The technology that is now capable of eliminating the stupefying labour that turns men into specialized tools of production, this technology permits in principle the leisure and the educational opportunities that make them able to use this information in a rational way. And, furthermore, even an economic elite which is dripping with soulfulness, to use Ralph Noloban’s phrase, is constrained by the system in which it functions to organise production for certain ends; power, growth, profit, but not in the nature of the case human needs. Needs that to an ever more critical degree can be expressed only in collective terms. It is surely conceivable and perhaps it’s even likely, that decisions made by the collective itself, will reflect these needs and interests as well as those made by various soulful elites. [35:12]
In any event it is a bit difficult to take seriously arguments about efficiency in a society that devotes such enormous resources to waste and destruction. As everyone knows, the very concept of efficiency is dripping with ideology. Maximization of commodities is hardly the only measure of a decent existence. The point is familiar and no elaboration is necessary.
## State Systems [35:32]
Well let me turn finally to the two final points of reference: The Bolshevik or state socialist and state capitalist. As I have tried to suggest they have points in common and in an interesting respects they diverge from the classical liberal ideal or its later elaboration in libertarian socialism. Since I am concerned with our society let me make a few rather elementary observations, about the role of the state, its likely evolution and the ideological assumptions that accompany and sometimes disguise this phenomena. Its obvious, to begin with, that we can distinguish two systems of power, the political system and the economic system. The former consists in principle of elected representatives of the people who set public policy, the latter, in principle, is a system of private power, a system of private empires that are free from public control, except in remote and indirect ways in which even a fuedal nobility or a totalitarian dictatorship must be responsive to the public will. There are several immediate consequences of this organization of society. [36:34]
The first is that in a subtle way an authoritarian cast of mind is induced in a very large mass of the population, which is subject to arbitrary decree from above. I think that this has a great effect on the general character of the culture: the belief that one must obey arbitrary dictates and accede to authority, and I think that in fact a remarkable and exciting fact about the youth movement in recent years is that it is challenging and beginning to break down some of these authoritarian patterns. [37:10]
Second fact that is important is that the range of decisions that are in principle subject to public democratic control is quite narrow. For example it excludes in law and in principle the central institutions in any advanced industrial society that is the entire commercial, industrial and financial system. And a third fact is that, even within the narrow range of issues that are submitted in principle to democratic decision making, the centers of private power of course exert an inordinately heavy influence in perfectly obvious ways, through control the media, through control the political organizations, or in fact by the simple and direct means of supplying the top personnel for the parliamentary system itself, as they obviously do. Dick Barnet in a recent study of this reports his study of the top 400 decision makers in the post war national security system, that: „most have come from executive suites and law offices within shouting distance of each other, in 15 city blocks in 5 major cities.“ And every other study shows the same thing. In short, the democratic system at best functions within a very narrow range in a capitalist democracy and even within this narrow range its functioning is enormously biased by the concentrations of private power and by the authoritarian and passive modes of thinking that are induced by autocratic institutions such as industries, for example. It is a truism, but one that must be constantly stressed, that capitalism and democracy are ultimately quite incompatible. And a careful look at the matter, I think, merely strengthens this conclusion. [38:41]
There are perfectly obvious processes of centralization of control taking place in both the political and the industrial system. As far as the political system is concerned in every parliamentary democracy, not only ours, the role of parliament in policy formation has been declining in the years since WWII as everyone knows and political commentators repeatedly point out. The executive, in other words, become increasingly powerful as the planning functions of the state become more significant. The house Armed Services Commitee a couple of years ago described the role of Congress as that of a sometimes querulous but essentially kindly uncle, who complains while furiously puffing on his pipe, but who finally, as everyone expects, gives in and hands over the allowance. And careful studies of civil military decisions since WWII show that this is quite an accurate perception. Senator Vandenberg 20 years ago expressed his fear that the American chief executive would become „the number one warlord of the earth“. That has since occurred. The clearest decision is the decision to escalate in Vietnam in February 1965 in cynical disregard of the expressed will of the electorate. This incident reveals I think with perfect clarity the role of the public in decisions about peace and war. The role of the public in decisions about the main lines about public policy in general, and it also suggests the irrelevance of electoral politics to major decisions of national policy. [40:13]
Unfortunately you can’t vote the rascals out, because you never voted them in, in the first place. [applause]
The corporate executives and the corporation lawyers and so on who overwhelmingly staff the executive, assisted increasingly by a university based mandarin class, these people remain in power no matter whom you elect and furthermore it is interesting to note that this ruling elite is pretty clear about its social role. [40:37]
As an example take Robert MacNamara, who is the person widely praised in liberal circles for his humanity, his technical brilliance and his campaign to control the military. His views of social organisation, I think, are quite illuminating. He says vital decision making in policy matters as well as bussiness must remain at the top, that is partly though not completely, what the top is for, and he goes on to suggest that this is apparently a divine imperative. [laughter]
I quote: „God is clearly democratic. He distributes brain power universally, but he quite justifiably expects us to do something efficient and constructive with that priceless gift. That’s what management is all about. [laughter]
Management in the end is the most creative of all the arts for its medium is human talent itself. The real threat to democracy comes from undermanagement. The undermanagement of a society is not the respect of liberty. It is simply to let some force other than reason shape reality. If it is not reason that rules man, then man falls short of his potential.“ So reason, then, is to be identified as the centralization of decision-making at the top in the hands of management. Popular involvement in decision making is a threat to liberty, a violation of reason. Reason is embodied in autocratic tightly managed institutions. Strengthening these institutions within which man can function most efficiently is in his words „the great human adventure of our times.“ Now all of this has a faintly familiar ring to it and it is the authentic voice of the technical intelligensia, the liberal intelligensia of the technocratic corporate elite in a modern society. [42:16]
There is a parallel process of centralization in economic life. There is a recent FTC report which notes that the 200 largest manufacturing corporations now control about two thirds of all manufacturing assets. At the beginning of WWII the same amount of power was spread over a thousand corporations. I quote the report. It says: „a small industrial elite of huge conglomerate companies is gobbling up American bussiness and largely destroying competitive free enterprise.“ Furthermore it says „these two hundred corporations are partially linked with each other and with other corporations in ways that may prevent or discourage independent behaviour in market decisions.“ What is novel about such observations is only their source: the FTC. They are familiar to the point of cliche among left-liberal commentators on American society. [43:05]
The centralization of power also has an international dimension. It has been pointed out that, I am quoting from „Foreign Affairs“, „on the basis of the gross value of their output, US enterprises abroad in the aggregate comprised the third largest country in the world, with a gross product greater than that of any country except the United States and the Soviet Union. American firms control over half the automobile industry in England, almost 40% of petroleum in Germany, over 40% of the telegraphic, telephone, electronic and business equipment in France, 75% of the computers. Within a decade, given present trends, more than half of the British exports will be from American owned companies“. And furthermore, these are highly concentrated investments: 40% of direct investment in Germany, France and Britain is by three firms, American firms. [44:01]
George Ball has explained that the project of constructing an integrated world economy dominated by American capital, an empire in other words, is no idealistic pipe dream, but a hard headed prediction. It’s a role, he says, into which we are being pushed by the imperatives of our own economy. The major instrument being the multinational corporation which George Ball describes as follows: „in its modern form the multinational corporation, or one with worldwide operations and markets, is a distinctly American development. Through such corporations it has become possible for the first time to use the world’s resources with maximum efficiency, but there must be greater unification of the world economy to give full play to the benefits of multinational corporations.“ These multinational corporations are the beneficiary of the mobilization of resources by the federal government and its worldwide operations and markets are backed ultimately by American military force, now based in dozens of countries. It is not difficult to guess who will reap the benefits from the integrated world economy, which is the domain of operation of these American based international economic institutions. [45:04]
Well, at this stage in the discussion one has to mention the specter of communism. What is the threat of communism to this system ? For a clear and cogent answer, one can turn to an extensive study of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and National Planning Association called the „Political Economy of American Foreign Policy“, a very important book. It was compiled by a representative segment of the tiny elite that largely sets public policy for whoever is technically in office. In effect, it’s as close as you can come to a manifesto of the American ruling class. Here they define the primary threat of communism as „the economic transformation of the communist powers in ways which reduce their willingness or ability to complement the industrial economies of the West.“ That is the primary threat of communism. Communism, in short, reduces the willingness and ability of underdeveloped countries to function in the world capitalist economy in the manner of for example the Philippines, which has developed a colonial economy of a classic type after 75 years of American tutelage and domination. It’s this doctrine which explains why the British economist Joan Robinson describes the American crusade against communism as a crusade against development. [46:23]
The cold war ideology and the international communist conspiracy function in an important way, as essentially a propaganda device, to mobilize support at a particular historical moment for this long time imperial enterprise. In fact, I believe that this is probably the main function of cold war. It serves as a useful device for the managers of the American society and their counterparts in the Soviet Union to control their own populations and their own respective imperial systems. I think that the persistence of the cold war can be in part explained by its utility for the managers of the two great world systems. [46:52]
Well, there is one final element that has to be added to this picture, namely the ongoing militarization of American society. How does this enter in ? To see, one has to look back at WWII and to recall that prior to WWII of course we were deep in the depression. WWII taught an important economic lesson. It taught the lesson that government induced production in a carefully controlled economy, centrally controlled, could overcome the effects of the depression. I think that is what Charles E. Wilson had in mind at the end of 1944 when he proposed that we have a permanent war economy in the postwar world. Of course the trouble is that in a capitalist economy there are only a number of ways in which government intervention can take place. It can’t be competitive with the private empires for example, which is to say that there can’t be any useful production. In fact it has to be the production of luxury goods. Goods, not capital, not useful commodities, which would be competitive. And unfortunately there is only one category of luxury goods that can be produced endlessly with rapid obsolescence, quickly wasting and no limit on how many of them you can use. We all know what that is. [48:01]
This whole matter is described pretty well by the business historian Alfred Chandler. He describes the economic lessons of WWII as follows: „The government spent far more than the most enthusiastic New Dealer had ever proposed. Most of the output of the expenditures was destroyed or left on the battlefields of Europe and Asia, but the resulting increased demand sent the nation into a period of prosperity, the like of which had never before been seen. Moreover, the supplying of huge armies and navies fighting the most massive war of all time required a tight centralized control of national economy. This effort brought corporate managers to Washington to carry out one of the most complex pieces of economic planning in history. That experience lessened the ideological fears over the government’s role in stabilizing the economy.“ (This is a conservative commentator, I might point out.) It may be added that the ensuing cold war carried further the de-politicization of the American society and created the kind of psychological environment in which the government is able to intervene in part through fiscal policies and in part through public work and public services, but very largely of course through defense spending. [49:16]
In this way, to use Alfred Chandler’s words, „the government acts as a coordinator of last resort when managers are unable to maintain a high level of aggregate demand.“ As another conservative business historian, Joseph Monson, writes, „enlightened corporate managers, far from fearing government intervention in the economy, view the new economics as a technique for increasing corporate viability.“ Of course, the most cynical use of these ideas is by the managers of the publicly subsidized war industries. There was a remarkable series in the Washington Post about this about an year ago, by Bernard Nossiter. For example he quoted Samuel Downer, financial vice president of LTV Aerospace, one of the big new conglomerates, who explained why the postwar world must be bolstered by military orders. He said: „It’s basic.“ „Its selling appeal is the defense of the home. This is one of the greatest appeals the politicians have to adjusting the system. If you’re the president and you need a control factor in the economy, and you need to sell this factor, you can’t sell Harlem and Watts, but you can sell self-preservation, a new environment. We are going to increase defense budgets as long as those bastards in Russia are ahead of us. The American people understand this.“ Of course, those bastards aren’t exactly ahead of us in this deadly and cynical game, but that is only a minor embarrassment to the thesis. In times of need we can always follow Dean Rusk, Hubert Humphrey and other luminaries and appeal to the billion Chinese armed with to the teeth and setting out on world conquest. [laughter]
[50:43]
Again I want to emphasize the role in this system of the Cold War as a technique of domestic control, a technique for developing the psychological climate of paranoia and psychosis in which the tax payer will be willing to provide an enormous, endless subsidy to the technologically advanced sectors of the American industry and the corporations that dominate this increasingly centralized system. [51:06]
Well, of course it’s perfectly obvious that Russian imperialism is not an invention of American ideologists. It’s real enough to the Hungarians and the Chezchs, for example. What is an invention is the uses to which it is put, for example by Dean Acheson in 1950 or Walt Rostow a decade later when they pretend that the Vietnam war is an example of Russian imperialism. Or by the Johnson administration in 1965, when he justifies the Dominican intervention with reference to the Sino-Soviet military bloc. Or by the Kennedy intellectuals, who, as Townsend Hoops put it in an article in the „Washington Monthly“ last month, were „deluded by the tensions of the cold war years, and could not perceive that the triumph of the national revolution in Vietnam would not be a triumph for Moscow and Peking.“ It was the most remarkable degree of delusion on the part of presumably literate men. Or, for example, by Eugene Rostow, who in a recent book that was very widely praised by liberal senators and academic intellectuals, outlined the series of challenges to world order in the modern era as follows: „Napoleon, Kaiser Willhelm, Hitler,“ and continuing in the post war world, „general strikes in France and Italy, the civil war in Greece, and the attack on South Vietnam“ where, he writes in 1968, „Russia has put us to severe tests in its efforts to spread communism by the sword.“ [52:31]
Now this is a very interesting series of challenges to World order: Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm, Hitler, general strikes in France and Italy, the civil war in Greece and the the Russian attack on South Vietnam. If one thinks it through he can reach some pretty interesting conclusions about modern history. [52:50]
Well, one can continue with this indefinitely. I mean to suggest that the cold war is highly functional, both to the American elite and it’s Soviet counterpart, who in a perfectly similar way exploit Western imperialism, which they did not invent, as they send their armies into Czechoslovakia. It’s important in both cases in providing an ideology for empire and for the government subsidized system here of military capitalism. It’s predictable then that challenges to this ideology will be bitterly resisted, by force if necessary. On many ways American society is indeed open, and liberal values are preserved. However, as poor people and black people and other ethnic minorities know very well, the liberal veneer is pretty thin. Mark Twain once wrote that „it is by the goodness of God that in our country that we have those three unspeakably precious things: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice either of them.“ [laughter]
Those who lack the prudence may well pay the cost. [53:53]
Roughly speaking, I think its accurate to say that a corporate elite of managers and owners governs the economy and the political system as well, at least in a very large measure. The people, so-called, do exercise an occasional choice among those who Marx once called „the rival factions and adventurers of the ruling class“. And those who find this characterization too harsh may prefer the formulations of a modern democratic theorist like Joseph Schumpeter, who describes modern political democracy, favorably, „as a system in which the deciding of issues by the electorate is secondary to the election of the men who ought to do the deciding. The political parties“, he says, accurately, „is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power. If that were not so, it would be impossible for different parties to adopt exactly or almost exactly the same program.“ That’s all the advantages of political democracy as he sees it. [54:49]
This program, that both parties adopt more or less exactly, and the individuals who compete for power, they express a narrow conservative ideology, basically the interests of one or other element in the corporate elite, with some modifications. Now this is obviously no conspiracy, I think it is simply implicit in the system of corporate capitalism. These people and the institutions they represent are in effect in power and their interests are the national interests. It is this interest that is served primarily and overwhelmingly by the overseas empire and the growing system of military state capitalism at home. [55:25]
If we were to withdraw the consent of the governed, as I think we should, we are withdrawing our consent to have these men and the interests they represent; govern and manage American society and impose their concept of world order and their criteria for legitimate political and economic development in much of the world. Although an immense effort of propaganda and mystification is carried on to conceal these facts, nonetheless facts they remain. [55:52]
We have today the technical and material resources to meet man’s animal needs. We have not developed the cultural and moral resources or the democratic forms of social organization that make possible the humane and rational use of our material wealth and power. Conceivably, the classical liberal ideals, as expressed and developed in their libertarian socialist form, are achievable. But if so, only by a popular revolutionary movement, rooted in wide strata of the population, and committed to the elimination of repressive and authoritarian institutions, state and private. To create such a movement is a challenge we face and must meet if there is to be an escape from contemporary barbarism. [Applause.]
More Chomsky audio sources: http://www.chomsky.info/audionvideo.htm
Sviđa mi seSviđa mi se